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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ERICKSON v. BARTELL: THE “COMMON SENSE” APPROACH TO
EMPLOYER-BASED INSURANCE FOR WOMEN

We do not want special privileges. We do not need special privileges. We
outlast you—we outlive you—we nag you to death. So why should we want
special privileges?
I believe we can hold our own. We are entitled to this little crumb of
equality.
The addition of that little terrifying word “s-e-x” will not hurt this
legislation in any way. In fact, it will improve it. It will make it
comprehensive. It will make it logical. It will make it right.1

I. INTRODUCTION
Over eighty years ago American women received the right to vote.2 Fortynine years ago Congress declared sex-based employment discrimination
unlawful in Title VII.3 Twenty-nine years ago a woman’s right to make her
own decisions about her reproductive health was buttressed by Roe v. Wade.4
In 2001, two women, Roberta Riley and Jennifer Erickson, were added to Ms.
Magazine’s “Woman of the Year” list,5 and for good reason: they helped to
continue this trend. In the spring of 2001, a district court aided that effort by
deciding that commonly used prescription contraceptives must be covered by
employer-based prescription drug plans.6 Indeed, in an ongoing effort to

1. 110 CONG. REC. H2581 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1964) (statement of Rep. St. George). This is
a brief excerpt of the argument made by Representative St. George to the House of
Representatives to include “sex” in Title VII.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of Sex.”).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5. Woman
of
the
Year,
MS.
Dec.
2001-Jan.
2002,
available
at
http://www.msmagazine.com/dec01/woty.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2002). Roberta Riley was the
attorney for Jennifer Erickson, the class representative for the non-union female employees of
Bartell Drug Company in Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D. Wash.
2001). Though this effort to mandate prescription contraceptive coverage did not begin, nor will
it end, with these two women, their case prompted a court, for the first time in our history, to
mandate this coverage in the context of employer-based prescription plans. See id.
6. This holding was directed only at employer-based insurance plans that covered
prescription drugs. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1277 (W.D. Wash. 2001). In Erickson, the
463
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achieve a greater degree of equality in all facets of their lives, American
women have persevered to take control of their bodies, health and
reproduction.7 Riley and Erickson’s active pursuance of this goal has brought
to women8 the benefit of mandatory prescription drug coverage, but has also
opened the door for further movement toward a truer sex equality in the
workplace.9 As Margaret Graham Tebo wrote, “Margaret Sanger would be
thrilled.”10
On June 12, 2001, the United States District Court for the Western District
of Washington, in Erickson v. Bartell Drug Company,11 held that an
employer’s prescription drug plan must provide at least partial coverage to
contraceptive devices such as birth control pills, intra-uterine devices,
diaphragms, the Depro-Provera shot and implants such as Norplant.12 This
case of first impression13 marked a major step in the lengthy struggle to thwart
prescription drug coverage was comprehensive. Id. at 1268. However, the Erickson holding does
not apply to insurance plans that exclude prescription drug coverage completely. Id. at 1272.
7. While the problems in prescription drug coverage set forth by Erickson were solely legal
questions, the legal team behind the plaintiff realized that the public needed to hear about the
case. To accomplish this goal, they hired the P.R. firm of Douglas Gould & Co. to create “a proactive strategic media campaign” for the case in order to spread the word to many national
newspapers, most (if not all) of the major television networks, and other media. Douglas Gould
& Co., Erickson v. Bartell—Reproductive Rights and Contraceptive Policy, at
http://www.douglasgould.com/pages/reprorights.htm (last visited May 13, 2002).
8. Erickson, a district court case, only applies to women and employers in the State of
Washington.
9. Planned Parenthood created a web site to answer questions about Erickson and its effect
on other states and employers. See Planned Parenthood, Cover My Pills: Fair Access to
Contraceptives, at http://www.covermypills.org.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2002). As of Fall
2001, however, sixteen states had laws that required “insurance companies that cover
prescriptions to also include full contraceptive coverage”: California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, New Mexico, Nevada, New Hampshire,
North Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas and Vermont. Sierra Club, Senate Committee Discusses
Domestic Insurance Contraceptive Coverage, POPULATION REPORT, Fall 2001, at 1, available at
http://www.sierraclub.org/population. See also Susan A. Cohen, Federal Law Urged As
Culmination of Contraceptive Insurance Coverage Campaign, THE GUTTMACHER REPORT ON
PUBLIC POLICY, Oct. 2001, at 11.
10. Margaret Graham Tebo, Power to the Pill, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2001, at 22, 22 (2001).
Thrilled, indeed. “Nearly a century after the women’s rights advocate began her crusade to
overturn laws banning contraception for women, a federal District Court has ruled that excluding
prescription birth control coverage from health insurance plans is a violation of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act.” Id. For a short description of the social causes that Margaret Sanger
supported,
see
Planned
Parenthood,
About
Us:
Margaret
Sanger,
at
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/about/thisispp/sanger.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2003).
11. 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
12. Id. at 1277.
13. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Decision on Coverage of
Contraception (Dec. 14, 2000), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/decisioncontraception.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2002). While Erickson was the first court to hold that
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sex discrimination in the workplace stemming from inequitable employerbased prescription drug plans.
Erickson is a welcome addition to the body of law surrounding Title VII
and its subsequent amendment, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA).
Undoubtedly, the coverage it provides will make contraception more
affordable and accessible to women and greatly reduce the costs—physical,
emotional and financial—associated with the thousands of unintended and
unplanned pregnancies occurring each year.14 Before celebrating this longawaited step, however, there is a need to examine the long road of law leading
up to Erickson, as well as its many possible effects. To be sure, the effects of
Erickson involve, at the least, both practical and legal concerns.
The practical effects of Erickson are quite impressive. Erickson’s
interpretation of Title VII sex discrimination will impose new obligations on
employers with respect to the medical benefits they choose to extend to their
employees. In addition, Erickson will have second-hand effects on both the
insurers utilized by employers as well as the masses of paying beneficiaries.
The cost of this new statutory requirement must be absorbed somewhere. And
finally, the social, political and economic impacts of the holding will affect all
citizens, as women and families are given a greater opportunity to prevent
unanticipated pregnancies. It goes without saying that a degree of uncertainty
will unquestionably accompany any estimates on the true ramifications of
Erickson.
While working women and spouses of working men nationwide will,
without doubt, welcome the new benefit of partial coverage of contraceptive
prescription contraceptives must be covered by employer-based prescription plans in accordance
with Title VII, the EEOC has come to that same conclusion at least twice. Id. The EEOC
Decision of December 14, 2000 was in response to two women who were denied coverage for
prescription birth control, despite the fact that the plans covered prescription drugs, preventative
care, vaccinations and surgical means of contraception such as vasectomies and tubal ligations.
Id. The EEOC concluded that in order for an employer to avoid violating Title VII, employers
“must cover the expenses of prescription contraceptives to the same extent, and on the same
terms, that they cover the expenses of the types of drugs, devices and preventative care . . . [and
the employer’s] coverage must extend to the full range of prescription contraceptive choices.” Id.
A similar issue was pending in another case, EEOC v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 141 F. Supp.
2d 1216 (D. Minn. 2001) (hereinafter “UPS”). UPS focused on allegations of disparate treatment
and disparate impact under Title VII when the UPS employee was denied coverage for his wife’s
prescription oral contraceptive, which was prescribed to treat a hormonal disorder, not to prevent
pregnancy. Id. at 1217.
14. See Sylvia A. Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance for Contraception, 73 WASH. L.
REV. 363, 364-65 (1998). “Almost sixty percent of the 6.3 million pregnancies that occur
annually in the United States are unintended.” Id. at 364. Professor Law also described the costs
and consequences of unintended pregnancies: “Unintended pregnancy: (1) increases infant
mortality and morbidity; (2) generates financial costs for childbirth and the care of distressed
newborns; (3) leads to high rates of abortion; and (4) limits women’s abilities to perform and
contribute to society and undermines national economic stability.” Id. at 364-65.
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devices in their prescription benefit plans, the holding seems to predict a
massive resource shift between insurance companies and their beneficiaries,
yielding resistance from insurers and employers. In addition, the applicability
of Erickson may be questioned; it is difficult to assess, at this point, whether
more women will utilize these contraceptive measures or if the result will be a
reduction of costs for the women currently taking the medications, or both. In
any case, the medical and economic benefits of Erickson for men, women and
children, as well as their insurers and employers, should far outweigh its
negative effects.
This Note will examine Erickson in the context of a continually developing
body of law championing the procurement of true sex equality in the
workplace. It will begin by discussing the theories of discrimination argued by
the plaintiff in Erickson: disparate treatment and disparate impact under Title
VII and the PDA. It will also retrace the development of the statutes and the
case law comprising this body of law, including Title VII sex discrimination
before and after its amendment by the addition of the PDA. Finally, this Note
will discuss the issues, arguments, reasoning and holding of Erickson, and its
significance and impact for female employees, and conclude with an
elaboration of responses to Bartell’s arguments.
II. THEORIES OF TITLE VII DISCRIMINATION: DISPARATE TREATMENT AND
DISPARATE IMPACT
Before discussing the application of Title VII to the facts in Erickson and
cases preceding it, an overview of the different ways in which Title VII may be
violated must be presented. The code created by the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
governing Title VII discrimination, provides that
(a) Employer Practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.15

15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (2000). Section 2000e-2(a)(1) corresponds with the
disparate treatment theory of discrimination, while section 2000e-2(a)(2) corresponds with the
disparate impact theory of discrimination.
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Title VII may be violated by the performance of acts that discriminate in
two ways: through disparate treatment,16 which is intentional discrimination,
and disparate impact,17 which involves discriminatory effects stemming from a
facially neutral policy. Both theories of discrimination were argued by the
employee-claimant in Erickson.18 The Supreme Court noted the differences
between these two theories in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States:
“Disparate treatment” . . . is the most easily understood type of
discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than
others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of
discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred
from the mere fact of differences in treatment. . . . Claims of disparate
treatment may be distinguished from claims that stress “disparate impact.” . . .
[that] involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment
of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another
and cannot be justified by business necessity.19

A.

Disparate Treatment under Title VII

Under the disparate treatment theory “[a] plaintiff alleging a claim of
disparate treatment must establish that the employer intended to discriminate
against the protected group. If direct evidence20 of discriminatory intent is not
available, a plaintiff may present circumstantial evidence from which an
inference of intentional discrimination may be drawn.”21 The Supreme Court
established the burden-shifting framework for Title VII discrimination claims

16. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See also City of Los
Angeles, Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (holding that an
employment practice requiring all female employees to contribute more money than male
employees into a benefits fund exhibited disparate treatment when it “[did] not pass the simple
test of whether the evidence show[ed] ‘treatment of a person in a manner which but for that
person’s sex would be different.’”) (quoting Developments in the Law, Employment
Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1170
(1971)); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (holding that an
employer’s treatment of employees less favorably due to their race, color, religion, sex or national
origin constituted disparate treatment in violation of Title VII).
17. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters,
431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
18. Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1268 n.2 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
19. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
20. Cases involving direct evidence of discrimination do not require the burden-shifting
framework. One case involving a showing of direct evidence of race-based employment
discrimination is Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, 199 F.3d 572 (1st Cir. 1999).
21. Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp., Inc., 33 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Troupe v.
May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994)).
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alleging disparate treatment in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green;22 this
evidentiary burden-shifting requirement may be broken down into three steps.
First,
[t]he complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the
statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This may be
done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii)
that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection,
the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants
from persons of the complainant’s qualifications.23

This initial burden, which rests solely on the employee, constitutes the
plaintiff’s prima facie case24 and creates a rebuttable presumption25 that the
Title VII prohibited discrimination occurred. Second, “[t]he burden then must
shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

22. 411 U.S. 792 (1973); See generally Armstrong, 33 F.3d 1308. The sex discrimination
alleged, though not proven, in Armstrong, was for the loss of a position of employment due to
sex, when a pregnant nurse was terminated from her job after refusing to treat an HIV positive
patient. Id. at 1310-11. She felt that the patient’s high risk for contracting opportunistic diseases
would put her fetus at risk. Id. Her termination was not found to be discriminatory. Id. at 1318.
Though Armstrong was based on an allegation of sex discrimination via unlawful
termination, and was not based on a differential in employee benefits based on sex, these prima
facie elements are still more applicable to the sex discrimination claims in Erickson than the racebased prima facie elements from McDonnell Douglas. Furthermore, though Armstrong is not a
Supreme Court case, it explained the theories of disparate treatment and disparate impact
particularly well and, therefore, applied the statutory requirements (as opposed to the common
law requirements predating codification) for a showing of disparate impact. For these reasons
Armstrong is a helpful source in understanding disparate treatment and disparate impact in Title
VII sex discrimination cases.
Under the disparate treatment theory in Armstrong, the elements of a prima facie Title
VII sex discrimination claim required the claimant to show that:
(1) the plaintiff [was] a member of a group protected by Title VII;
(2) the plaintiff was qualified for the position;
(3) the plaintiff suffered an adverse effect on her employment; and
(4) the plaintiff suffered from differential application of work or disciplinary rules.
Armstrong, 33 F.3d at 1314 (citing Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp. Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1183, 1189
(M.D. Ala. 1993)).
23. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
24. Id.
25. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). Burdine elaborated
on the plaintiff’s prima facie case and the presumption it created. Id. “The prima facie case
‘raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise
unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors.’
Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the employer
unlawfully discriminated against the employee.” Id. (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567 (1978)).
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for the employee’s rejection.”26 “The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put
forward by the defendant . . . may, together with the elements of the prima
facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the
defendant’s proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate
fact of intentional discrimination. . . .”27 Finally, the employee must be
afforded a chance to show that the employer’s stated legitimate reason was in
reality “a pretext for the sort of discrimination prohibited by [Title VII].”28
This burden—to show that the defendant’s justification was merely a pretext—
belongs to the claimant,29 thereby vesting the “ultimate burden of persua[sion]”
on the claimant.30
B.

Disparate Impact under Title VII

Again, the statutory language governing disparate impact under Title VII
was laid out in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2):
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
....
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.31

26. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
27. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993). See also Burdine, 450 U.S. at
254. In Burdine, the Court concluded that this was not a permissive finding for the jury to make,
but instead a mandatory one, if the defendant failed to rebut the presumption. Id. “If the trier of
fact believes the plaintiff’s evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption,
the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case.” Id.
28. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. In McDonnell Douglas, the employer’s excuse for
not re-hiring the former employee was that the employee engaged in disruptive and illegal
demonstrations against the employer—a “lock-in” and “stall-in”—as a participant in a civil rights
organization protesting against the employer. Id. at 795. While McDonnell Douglas held that an
employee-complainant in a Title VII claim must have the opportunity to show that the employerdefendant’s legitimate reasons were pretextual, it also pointed out that an employer “may
justifiably refuse to rehire one who was engaged in unlawful, disruptive acts against it, but only if
this criterion is applied alike to members of all races.” Id. at 804. The McDonnell Douglas Court
also set forth some examples of evidence an employee could use to reveal that an employer’s
legitimate excuse was really a pretext for discrimination: “facts as to the petitioner’s treatment of
respondent during his prior term of employment; petitioner’s reaction, if any, to respondent’s
legitimate civil rights activities; and petitioner’s general policy and practice with respect to
minority employment.” Id. at 804-05.
29. Id. at 804; St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 516 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
30. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 516 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2000). See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 457 (1982)
(Powell, J., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court first addressed the theory of disparate impact—
unintentional discrimination—in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., when it stated that
Title VII “proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”32 Disparate impact focuses on
the effect of policies implemented by employers, and the greater “impact” that
facially neutral policies may have on groups protected by Title VII as
compared to the effect and impact policies may have on non-protected
groups.33 The Court’s goal in Griggs was to adhere to the provisions in the
statutes promulgated by Congress in its enactment of Title VII.34 “Under the
Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in
terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo
of prior discriminatory employment practices.”35 While “the Act does not
command that any person be hired simply because he was formerly the subject
of discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority group,”36 it does
require “the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis
of racial or other impermissible classification.”37 The Court points out,
however, that if the questionable classification or test can be legitimately and
rationally based on a business need of the employer, then the act will be
32. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). In Griggs, the Supreme Court
held that an employer’s requirements of a high school diploma or achievement of “satisfactory
scores on two professionally prepared aptitude tests” to qualify for a promotion to the company’s
different departments discriminated against the employee-plaintiffs, African-American men. Id.
at 427-28.
33. See id. at 424. See also Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977); Teal, 457 U.S. 440. See generally Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994
(1988); Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp., Inc., 33 F.3d 1308, 1314-15 (11th Cir. 1994).
34. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30.
35. Id. at 430. The employer in Griggs relied in part upon Section 703(h) of Title VII,
which allowed for nondiscriminatory employment tests:
(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer . . . to give and act upon the results of any
professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action
upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2000).
36. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-31 (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 431. The Griggs court noted that the high school completion and professional
aptitude test requirements were discriminatory against African-American employees because they
had “long received inferior education in segregated schools.” Id. at 430. Data from the employer
revealed that “‘whites register[ed] far better on the Company’s alternative requirements’” than
African-Americans did. Id. at 430 (quoting Griggs v. Duke, 420 F.2d 1225, 1239 n.60 (4th Cir.
1970)). What made the “alternative requirements” ultimately discriminatory, however, was the
determination that “neither the high school completion requirement nor the general intelligence
test is shown to bear a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which
it was used.” Id. at 431.
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tolerated.38 “The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice
which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job
performance, the practice is prohibited.”39
Over time, the framework set forth by the Supreme Court in disparate
impact cases would eventually make it more difficult for an employee-plaintiff
to succeed. First, the Court increased the plaintiff’s prima facie burden,40 and,
second, the Court included in the plaintiff’s prima facie burden the requirement
of invalidating a business necessity defense asserted by the employer.41 The
plaintiff’s burden to establish a prima facie in a Title VII disparate impact
claim was complicated as the Court decided that something more than
statistical evidence of a discriminatory effect is required for a plaintiff to meet
this burden.42
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust set forth the initial evidentiary
framework for disparate impact cases.43 First, it is the burden of the plaintiff to
identify a particular employment practice that is effecting a discriminatory
impact on a protected class of employees.44 Next, “causation must be proved;
that is, the plaintiff must offer statistical evidence of a kind and degree
sufficient to show that the practice in question has caused the exclusion of
applicants for jobs or promotions because of their membership in a protected
group.”45 The defendant then has the opportunity to challenge the statistics set
forth by the plaintiff.46 “‘If the employer discerns fallacies or deficiencies in
the data offered by the plaintiff, he is free to adduce countervailing evidence of
his own.’”47 The employer may also buttress his position by showing that the
employment action causing the discriminatory effect is justified by “business
necessity,” though the “ultimate burden” of proof “remains with the plaintiff at
all times.”48 Once the employer meets this burden, however, the plaintiff can
counter by “‘show[ing] that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly

38. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32.
39. Id. at 431. In Griggs, the thing that made the “alternative requirements” ultimately
discriminatory, however, was the Court’s determination from the evidence that “neither the high
school completion requirement nor the general intelligence test is shown to bear a demonstrable
relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which it was used.” Id.
40. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
41. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
42. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 991-94.
43. See generally id.
44. Id. at 994. The Watson court focused this point particularly on subjective employment
practices versus objective employment practices. One major objective of Watson was to
determine if subjective practices would be applicable to a disparate impact critique; the Court
held that they would. Id. at 1010-11.
45. Id. at 994.
46. Watson, 487 U.S. at 996.
47. Id. at 996 (quoting Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977)).
48. Id. at 997.
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undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer’s legitimate
interest . . . .’”49
The Supreme Court discussed the heightened statistical requirement of the
plaintiff’s burden in Watson: “[T]he plaintiff’s burden in establishing a prima
facie case goes beyond the need to show that there are statistical disparities in
the employer’s work force.”50 Watson also elaborated upon the reasoning
behind requiring more than statistical evidence in plaintiff’s prima facie
burden:
Respondent insists, and the United States agrees, that employers’ only
alternative will be to adopt surreptitious quota systems in order to ensure that
no plaintiff can establish a statistical prima facie case.
We agree that the inevitable focus on statistics in disparate impact cases
could put undue pressure on employers to adopt inappropriate prophylactic
measures. . . .
....
. . . Preferential treatment and the use of quotas by public employers
subject to Title VII can violate the Constitution, and it has long been
recognized that the legal rules leaving any class of employers with “little
choice” but to adopt such measures would be “far from the intent of Title
VII.”51

The “business necessity” component of disparate impact, as the most
convenient way to establish a defense to practices causing discriminatory
effects, was greatly utilized by employers, and its parameters were, over time,
stretched by the Court ultimately to make it quite difficult for employees to
succeed in Title VII disparate impact claims. The Supreme Court reached its
limit, however, in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.52 In Wards Cove, the
Court reiterated the plaintiff’s prima facie requirements stated in Watson.
Particularly, the Court required a showing of “a specific or particular
employment practice that has created the disparate impact under attack.” It
also required that the plaintiff meet a “specific causation requirement.”53 To
achieve this, the plaintiff was instructed to use employment ‘“records or other
information which will disclose the impact which its tests and other selection
procedures have upon employment opportunities of persons by identifiable

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 998 (quoting Ablemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)).
Id. at 994.
Watson, 487 U.S. at 992-93 (citations omitted).
490 U.S. 642 (1989).
Id. at 657.
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race, sex, or ethnic group[s]’”54 to show “a causal link between challenged
employment practices and racial imbalances in the work force.”55
Wards Cove departed from prior holdings in its discussion of the business
necessity defense. Though “the employer carries the burden of producing
evidence of a business justification for his employment practice. . . . The
burden of persuasion . . . remains with the disparate-impact plaintiff.”56 The
plaintiff’s burden does not end after the plaintiff “established a prima facie
case of disparate impact.”57 On the contrary, the plaintiff would still retain the
burden to persuade the trier of fact that the business justification stated by the
defendant was “insubstantial.”58 This was akin to the plaintiff’s burden in a
disparate treatment case to persuade the trier of fact that an employer’s
legitimate reason was a pretext to discrimination,59 but in the context of
disparate impact jurisprudence, it was a new and troubling standard for
employees.
Finally, Wards Cove altered the prong of disparate impact allowing a
plaintiff to prevail with a showing of a suitable alternative to the business
practice effecting a discriminatory impact. Instead of this “alternative”
showing allowing a plaintiff to prevail under the disparate impact theory, the
Wards Cove court used this alternative showing instead to detect and prove
that a business practice was really a “‘pretext’ for discrimination,” as one
would find in a disparate treatment action.60 In this way, Wards Cove appeared
to blur the lines between the frameworks of disparate treatment and disparate
impact, two closely related, but quite distinct concepts.
The 1991 Civil Rights Act addressed the theory of disparate impact that
had evolved in the courts and culminated in Wards Cove in 1989. Particularly,
Congress intended to clarify the original disparate impact theory set forth in
Griggs, from which the courts had departed in many ways, resulting in making
it more difficult for Title VII claimants to state a valid claim under the
disparate impact theory.61 To achieve this, the 1991 Civil Rights Act codified
the prima facie requirements for a showing of disparate impact in violation of
Title VII. This amendment states that:
54. Id. at 658 (quoting Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. §
1607.4(A) (1988)) (alteration in original).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 659.
57. Wards Cove Packing Co., 490 U.S. at 659.
58. Id. at 659-60
59. See id. at 660.
60. Id. at 660 (quoting Ablemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)).
61. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40 (II) (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 1991 WL
87020, at *2 (West 2002). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 sought to address Supreme Court
decisions that placed more difficulties on the claimants suing under Title VII disparate impact
claims. See also H.R. REP. NO. 102-40 (I) (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 1991
WL 70454 (West 2002).
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(k)(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is
established under this subchapter only if—
(1) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent
with business necessity. . . .62

The statute also mandates that “business necessity may not be used as a
defense against a claim of intentional discrimination”63 and that any
employment decision premised on “race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin” is “an unlawful employment practice . . . even though other factors
also motivated the practice.”64
III. TITLE VII AND PRE-PDA CASE LAW
Though Title VII sex discrimination is discussed in many cases, there is
barely a mention of the topic in the statute’s legislative history.65 For example,
nothing in the Senate Report or the House of Representatives Report preceding
the adoption of the 1964 Civil Rights Act discussed or explained the protected
class of “sex.”66 The reports showed that the Congressional focus for the 1964
Civil Rights Act was primarily, if not solely, on race.67 As a result of this
absence of explanatory materials about “sex,” in some instances prior to 1978,
the courts misconstrued the intent of Congress in including “sex

62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2000).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(2) (2000).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000).
65. 88 CONG. REC. H2577 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1964) (statement of Rep. Smith). See, e.g.,
Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431 (1965-66); Jo
Freeman, How “Sex” Got Into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of Public Policy, 9
LAW & INEQ. 163 (1991). See Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1268-69
(W.D. Wash. 2001). It is a widely disputed anecdote of American history. Some scholars believe
that the inclusion of “sex” in Title VII legislation was not an original intention of its sponsors, but
was a roundabout occurrence and even perhaps the result of a backfiring of a conservative
congressman’s tactic in arguing his point. The point is, however, that “sex” was added as an
eleventh-hour attempt by a conservative lawmaker to convince his colleagues of the
ridiculousness Title VII as a whole by illustrating such ridiculousness through the addition of
“sex.” The senator’s attempt backfired, and “sex” was included in Title VII as a legitimate
category of prohibited discrimination. Due to this apparently unplanned inclusion of “sex” in
Title VII, the legislative history of discussions and debates of sex discrimination are sparse to say
the least. See also Megan Colleen Roth, Note, Rocking the Cradle with Erickson v. Bartell Drug
Co.: Contraceptive Insurance Coverage Takes a Step Forward, 70 UMKC L. REV. 781, 783
(2002).
66. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 1963 WL
4735; S. REP. NO. 88-872 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 1964 WL 4755.
67. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1964); S. REP. NO. 88-872 (1964).
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discrimination” in Title VII. The most prevalent example of this was the 1976
Supreme Court case of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.68 In response to the
courts’ handling69 of Title VII sex discrimination cases, and particularly in
response to Gilbert,70 Congress addressed this discrepancy by amending and
explicating Title VII sex discrimination with subsequent legislation, namely
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”) in 1978.71
Gilbert prompted Congress to restate and clarify its intent in including “sex
discrimination” within Title VII twelve years earlier, particularly in the context
of pregnancy.72 In Gilbert, the Supreme Court, disagreeing with “eighteen
federal district courts and all seven federal courts of appeals”73 that had
previously grappled with this question,74 held that an employer’s “disabilitybenefits plan [did] not violate Title VII because of its failure to cover
pregnancy-related disabilities.”75 In other words, to the Gilbert court, a
comprehensive plan excluding coverage for pregnancy, a condition felt only by
women, did not discriminate against women. Under Gilbert, the condition of
pregnancy did not equate to sex, and refusing to cover pregnancy in a
comprehensive disability insurance plan did not equate to refusing to cover
women in general. “The Court concluded that this exclusion in the company’s
benefits policy was not gender-related but condition-related” and “[b]ecause
the plan did not exclude any disability that could be incurred by both men and
women, it was not discriminatory.”76 To explain and illustrate its holding, the
Supreme Court in Gilbert aligned its analysis with a case it handled two years
prior, Geduldig v. Aiello.77
The issue contemplated in Geduldig was based on a disability insurance
system administered by the State of California and funded by private

68. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
69. And apparent mishandling, at least from Congress’ perspective.
70. H.R. REP. NO. 95-948 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 1978 WL 8570, at
*2 (West 2001).
71. Id.; Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676 (1983);
Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1269 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
72. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125.
73. H.R. REP. NO. 95-948 at *2.
74. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 147. Gilbert cited six of these appellate court holdings:
Communications Workers of Am. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975); Wetzel v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975); Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th
Cir. 1975); Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975); Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d
850 (6th Cir. 1975); Hutchinson v. Lake Oswego Sch. Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d. 961 (9th Cir. 1975).
75. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 145-46.
76. H.R. REP. NO. 95-948 at *2.
77. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). Though nearly thirty years old, Geduldig is
still relevant in current law topics. See generally Shannon E. Liss, The Constitutionality of
Pregnancy Discrimination: The Lingering Effects of Geduldig and Suggestions for Forcing Its
Reversal, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 59 (1997).
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employees to benefit those employees when they became temporarily unable to
work due to disabilities that were not covered by worker’s compensation.78
Particularly at issue was the plan’s refusal to cover costs for disabilities
associated with normal pregnancy and childbirth.79 The Geduldig court held
that the decisions made by the California insurance plan did not “amount[] to
invidious discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause” and further stated
that “California does not discriminate with respect to the persons or groups
which are eligible for disability insurance protection under the program.”80 An
important element to the Geduldig decision was the cost-factor of this statesponsored welfare program; the Supreme Court had previously addressed this
element.
[A] State “may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the
problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. . . . The legislature
may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting
others. . . .” Particularly with respect to social welfare programs, so long as the
line drawn by the State is rationally supportable, the courts will not interpose
their judgment as to the appropriate stopping point. “[T]he Equal Protection
Clause does not require that a State must choose between attacking every
aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all.”81

Therefore, since the employee had received coverage under the California plan
that was no different from anyone else covered by the plan (meaning that all
women with normal pregnancies were denied coverage, not just the appelleeemployee), the Geduldig court concluded that the act of exempting coverage
for all normal pregnancies was not discriminatory towards the employee.82
What the Geduldig court saw in Aiello’s claim was the simplified assertion
that she had “suffered discrimination because she encountered a risk that was
outside the program’s protection,” and this was a claim that was “not . . .
valid . . . under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”83
Furthermore, Geduldig contended that there was no evidence that

78. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 486.
79. Id. It is interesting to note that three of the original four plaintiffs in this action had
arguments that were deemed moot by the Supreme Court. Just ten days prior to this holding, the
case of Rentzer v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, 108 Cal. Rptr. 336 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1973), held that the statute should apply only to pregnancies with abnormal
complications. In other words, normal pregnancies could be excluded from the plan coverage.
As a result, the three other plaintiffs in Geduldig, who each had complications during pregnancy,
all of which resulting in either termination of the pregnancy or miscarriage, received coverage
under the plan, leaving the sole appellee with the normal pregnancy. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 489.
80. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 494.
81. Id. at 495 (omissions in original) (citations omitted).
82. See id. at 496-97.
83. Id. at 497.
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the selection of the risks insured by the program worked to discriminate
against any definable group or class in terms of the aggregate risk protection
derived by that group or class from the program. There is no risk from which
men are protected and women are not. Likewise, there is no risk from which
women are protected and men are not.84

Boiled down to the bottom line, this reasoning from Geduldig separated the
beneficiaries of the California plan into two groups: pregnant women, who
were refused coverage, and nonpregnant persons, who were not refused
coverage.85 The discriminatory effect of this division (that was ignored as “sex
discrimination” by both Geduldig and Gilbert on a “condition-based” coverage
theory) was that the only sex that could be omitted from coverage for
pregnancy, of course, was women.
Though Geduldig constitutionally justified the refusal of coverage for
normal pregnancy-related disabilities under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court saw it fit for comparison with
Gilbert, which was based instead on Title VII sex discrimination.86 The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that was relied upon in
Geduldig, states that “[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall . . .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”87
The Title VII language applicable in Gilbert stated that “it shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.”88 The Supreme Court aligned Gilbert with Geduldig based on its
belief that the Equal Protection Clause could be utilized “as a useful starting
point” to interpret the definition of the term “discrimination” as used in Title
VII.89 The Court, in Gilbert, explained why the Fourteenth Amendment and
Title VII should be read together:
While there is no necessary inference that Congress, in choosing this language,
intended to incorporate into Title VII the concepts of discrimination which
have evolved from court decisions construing the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the similarities between the congressional
language and some of those decisions surely indicate that the latter are a useful
starting point in interpreting the former. Particularly in the case of defining the
term “discrimination,” which Congress has nowhere in Title VII defined, those
cases afford an existing body of law analyzing and discussing that term in a

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 496-97.
Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20.
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 133 (1976).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(a)(1) (2000).
Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 133.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

478

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47:463

legal context not wholly dissimilar to the concerns which Congress manifested
in enacting Title VII.90

The Equal Protection Clause and Title VII share the similar goals of promoting
equality, by requiring equal protection of the laws in the former, and by
requiring equal treatment of employees in the latter. This seems to suggest,
then, that the equality in employment that is demanded by Title VII is also tied
to the idea that one can avoid committing the act of discriminating by applying
equal treatment to all persons.91
Similar law was not the only characteristic the Supreme Court felt Gilbert
shared with Geduldig; more striking was the similar issue of an employmentassociated92 health care benefits plan withholding coverage for disabilities that
stemmed from pregnancy. The plan disputed in Gilbert was offered by the
employer, General Electric Company (General Electric) as a part of the
This package provided
company’s “total compensation package.”93
“nonoccupational sickness and accident benefits to all employees under its
Weekly Sickness and Accident Insurance Plan . . . in an amount equal to 60%
of an employee’s normal straight-time weekly earnings.”94 Though General
Electric’s plan made payments “to employees who [became] totally disabled as
a result of a nonoccupational sickness or accident,”95 it repeatedly refused to
“provide disability-benefit payments for any absence due to pregnancy.”96
The Eastern District of Virginia, while handling General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert, found that “normal pregnancy, while not necessarily either a ‘disease’
or an ‘accident,’ was disabling for a period of six to eight weeks.”97
Accordingly, it found that General Electric “discriminated on the basis of sex

90. Id.
91. For a more complete discussion on the connection between the Equal Protection Clause
of the 14th Amendment and Title VII, see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973),
which, in regards to discriminatory statutes stated, “any statutory scheme which draws a sharp
line between the sexes, solely for the purpose of achieving administrative convenience,
necessarily commands ‘dissimilar treatment for men and women who are . . . similarly situated,’
and therefore involves the ‘very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the
[Constitution].’” Id. at 690 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971) (omission in
original). It appears that the Gilbert court applied this principle to employers acting in a
discriminatory nature, and not just to discriminatory actions of governments.
92. This distinction is made because the plan in Geduldig was funded by private employees
and administered by the State of California for coverage of privately employed persons, while the
Gilbert plan was a part of the compensation package that General Electric provided for its
employees.
93. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 128.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 129.
97. Id. at 130 (quoting Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 377 (E.D. Va. 1974)).
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in the operation of its disability program in violation of Title VII.”98 On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, affirmed the
District Court by a divided vote, deciding that Geduldig should not apply since
it concerned the Equal Protection Clause and not Title VII.99
The Supreme Court, however, saw the Gilbert controversy in a different
light and disagreed with the Fourth Circuit determination that Geduldig did not
apply:
Since it is a finding of sex-based discrimination that must trigger, in a case
such as this, the finding of an unlawful employment practice under [Title VII],
Geduldig is precisely in point in its holding that an exclusion of pregnancy
from a disability-benefits plan providing general coverage is not a genderbased discrimination at all.100

Despite the different law applied in Gilbert and Geduldig, the Supreme Court
felt that neither claimant had “attempted to meet the burden of demonstrating a
gender-based discriminatory effect resulting from the exclusion of pregnancyrelated disabilities from coverage.”101 The “burden” that the claimant in
Gilbert was required to meet constituted a showing of a prima facie violation
of Title VII; thus, the plaintiff in Gilbert failed to make the requisite initial
showing under Title VII of an inference of sex discrimination.102
A.

Disparate Treatment in the Context of Gilbert

Gilbert addressed the questions of whether an insurance plan that targeted
pregnancy, a condition vested solely upon women, discriminated against
women, either intentionally, through disparate treatment, or unintentionally,
through a disparate impact on women in violation of Title VII.103 The Court
handled the initial question of disparate treatment easily, as much of its
discussion of whether discrimination had occurred worked to rely upon, and
replicate, the kind of reasoning it had used previously in Geduldig,104 rather
than performing an independent analysis of the facts of Gilbert in the disparate
treatment framework established in McDonnell Douglas v. Green.105 First, the
Court examined the statute to determine whether General Electric
“discriminate[d] against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s

98. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 132 (citing Gilbert, 375 F. Supp. at 385-86).
99. Id. at 132; Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co. 519 F.2d 661, 666 (4th Cir. 1975).
100. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136.
101. Id. at 137.
102. Id. at 136-37. See supra notes 15-31 and accompanying text.
103. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 137.
104. See id. at 132-36.
105. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). See also supra notes
15-31 and accompanying text.
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race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”106 The Court found that the
plaintiff-employee failed to meet her prima facie burden. “Since gender-based
discrimination had not been shown to exist either by the terms of the plan or by
its effect, there was no need to reach the question of what sort of standard
would govern our review had there been such a showing.”107
In further support of its decision, the Court turned to its prior holding in
Geduldig “that an exclusion of pregnancy from a disability benefits plan
providing general coverage is not a gender-based [sic] discrimination at all”
and found that it was directly on point with Gilbert. Again, the Court aligned
the two cases despite Geduldig’s sole basis on the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and Gilbert’s foundation of Title VII. This
alignment was justified by the Court because cases based on either Title VII or
the Equal Protection Clause dealt with the “concepts of discrimination,” and
because the policies of insurance at play in Geduldig and Gilbert, as well as the
operation of each program, were quite similar:108
Since it is a finding of sex-based discrimination that must trigger, in a case
such as this, the finding of an unlawful employment practice under § 703(a)(1),
Geduldig is precisely in point in its holding that an exclusion of pregnancy
from a disability benefits plan providing general coverage is not a genderbased discrimination at all.109

Therefore, the Supreme Court felt that neither of these plans discriminated
against women.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that, as in Geduldig, General
Electric’s exclusions were not “pretexts designed to effect an invidious
discrimination against the members of one sex or the other.”110 In Geduldig,
the Gilbert court noted, this “pretext” question was framed in different terms:
“[A] distinction which on its face is not sex related might nonetheless violate
the Equal Protection Clause if it were in fact a subterfuge to accomplish a
forbidden discrimination.”111 The Court believed that General Electric’s
exclusion of pregnancy-related disability coverage did not impermissively
discriminate against women, though the Court noted that the condition was
“confined to women,”112 because it was “different from the typical covered

106. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 133 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).
107. Id. at 135.
108. Id. at 133-34.
109. Id. at 136.
110. Id. (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974); Gilbert v. Gen. Elec.
Co., 519 F.2d 661, 666 (4th Cir. 1975)). This point was originally made by the Supreme Court in
Geduldig, and was brought up again by the Supreme Court in Gilbert in response to the Fourth
Circuit in Gilbert.
111. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136.
112. Id.
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disease or disability.”113 “[Pregnancy] is not a ‘disease’ at all, and is often a
voluntarily undertaken and desired condition.”114 For these reasons, the Court
chose not to view General Electric’s “exclusion of pregnancy disability
benefits”115 as a “simple pretext for discriminating against women”116 and
held, accordingly, that the employee did not prove disparate treatment in
violation of Title VII.117
B.

Disparate Impact in the Context of Gilbert

Under the disparate impact theory of Title VII, the Gilbert Court required
“proof that the effect of an otherwise facially neutral plan or classification is to
discriminate against members of one class or another.”118 The standard used
by Gilbert was, from Griggs, whether “even absent proof of intent, the
consequences of the [plan] were ‘invidiously to discriminate on the basis of
racial or other impermissible classification.’”119 The Court determined that the
prima facie standard for disparate impact had not been fulfilled by the
claimant, relying on the fact that the District Court neither found, nor had
sufficient evidence to find, “that the financial benefits of the Plan ‘worked to
discriminate against any definable group or class in terms of the aggregate risk
protection derived by that group or class from the program.’”120 Since the
claimant in Gilbert failed to fulfill the prima facie standard for disparate
impact, the Court held that there was no violation of Title VII under the
disparate impact theory.121
The Court’s conclusion was based on its belief that not all women
employed by General Electric would become pregnant and utilize pregnancy
benefits, thereby justifying its interpretation of “pregnancy related disabilities”
as “additional risk[s].” Echoing its analysis in Geduldig, Gilbert described the
insurance plan as “nothing more than an insurance package, which covers
some risks, but excludes others,”122 adding that a disability plan’s
“underinclusion” of risks, or lack of comprehensiveness will not bring about
Title VII violation.123 The Court permitted this exclusion because it was an

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id. (citing Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 375, 377 (E.D. Va. 1974)).
Id.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136.
Id. at 137.
Id. (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-248 (1976)).
Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
Id. at 138 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 471 U.S. 484, 496 (1974)).
Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 137.
Id. at 138 (citing Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 494).
Id.
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“additional risk,”124 that happened to vest itself on some women, and therefore
it was lawful to exclude it from the disability plan:
For all that appears, pregnancy-related disabilities constitute an additional risk,
unique to women, and the failure to compensate them for this risk does not
destroy the presumed parity of the benefits accruing to men and women alike,
which results from the facially evenhanded inclusion of the risks.125

General Electric did not simply remove coverage from its women employees
that its male employees received, as that most certainly would have constituted
sex discrimination under Title VII in 1976.126 General Electric employees—
men and women—did receive the coverage for “exactly the same categories of
risk.”127 Rather, the exclusion was a cost-controlling decision that did not
remove from women benefits received by men, but instead removed benefits
from women that men did not also utilize,128 thereby justifying the exclusion in
the eyes of 1976 Title VII jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court’s conclusion in Gilbert meant that an otherwise
comprehensive plan that deliberately excluded pregnancy coverage was, in the
Court’s eyes, facially neutral and without a discriminatory effect on women.
In essence, the Court did not equate “pregnancy” with “sex”; under Title VII in
1976 the Court found that discrimination based on pregnancy was not the same
thing as discrimination based on sex. This disparity was corrected by the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment to Title VII in 1978.

124. Id. at 139.
125. Id.
126. One example this author can think of is coverage for disabilities associated with heart
attacks. Since both men and women have heart attacks, a health insurance policy that covered
heart attacks for men but not women would be clearly in violation of Title VII. Here, however,
since the condition of pregnancy does not happen to men, it is considered an “additional risk.”
127. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138.
128. See id. at 152 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Interestingly, the majority seems to suggest that
the coverage was exactly the same for male and female employees of General Electric, meaning
that excluding exclusively-female health care needs such as pregnancy was justified by the fact
that exclusively male health care needs were also excluded by the plan. The Gilbert majority
stated that “[General Electric’s benefits plan] covers exactly the same categories of risk, and is
facially nondiscriminatory in the sense that ‘[t]here is no risk from which men are protected and
women are not . . . . [and] no risk from which women are protected and men are not.’” Id. at 138
(quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974)) (second alteration in original). In fact,
there was coverage provided for exclusively-male needs, particularly “risks such as
prostatectomies, vasectomies, and circumcisions.” Id.
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III. THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1978
A.

The Dissent of Gilbert: A Foundation for the PDA

Rather than understanding the different sex-based health care needs of
women and men, the Gilbert court looked instead to a “common denominator”
of coverage needs: all men and women would be covered for the same
conditions. Since male employees did not get pregnant, General Electric’s
refusal to cover disabilities related to the condition of pregnancy was not
discriminatory towards women. Instead, Gilbert deemed pregnancy-related
disabilities “‘extra’ disabilities”129 that were mere “additional risk[s]”130
occurring outside of General Electric’s disability benefits plan. Gilbert
believed that “it is impossible to find any gender-based discriminatory effect in
this scheme simply because women disabled as a result of pregnancy do not
receive benefits; . . . gender-based discrimination does not result simply
because an employer’s disability-benefits plan is less than all-inclusive.”131
General Electric’s benefits exclusion did not affect all women employees
(since not all women were pregnant), thereby assuming two things: first, that
for a group to be discriminated against, it must be a “uniform
discrimination,”132 and second, that “pregnant women” did not constitute a
class protected under Title VII. These assumptions were taken up in the
dissent of Gilbert as well as the PDA. The Gilbert majority was rebutted by
the strong dissent of Justice Brennan, and even more importantly, by the
Congressional amendment to the Title VII provision for sex discrimination via
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.
The dissent of Justice Brennan in Gilbert, in which Justice Marshall
concurred, interpreted the applicability of Title VII to General Electric’s
disability plan exclusion in a much different manner. The disparity, Justice
Brennan noted, between the majority and his dissent133 hinged largely on the
“conceptual framework” that each side used to analyze the question. The two
sides differed on whether General Electric’s plan concerned “a gender-free
assignment of risks,”134 or something more, an omission of coverage that was
propelled by an intent to discriminate, and that carried with it a discriminatory
effect.135 Initially the dissent rejected the majority’s decision since the six
129. Id. at 139 n.17.
130. Id. at 139.
131. Id. at 138-39.
132. This means that Title VII sex discrimination would only occur if the employer
discriminated against all female employees. In Gilbert, however, General Electric’s disability
plan only discriminated against pregnant women. 429 U.S. at 147 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133. The majority, again, also departed from the stances of the lower courts of Gilbert, the
women plaintiffs and the EEOC.
134. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 147.
135. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

484

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47:463

appellate courts dealing with the same issue had “unanimous[ly] conclu[ded]”
that the type of disability benefits plan exclusion utilized by General Electric
violated Title VII.136 Furthermore, Brennan’s dissent took issue with the
majority’s “repudiat[ion] [of] the applicable administrative guideline
promulgated by the agency charged by Congress with implementation of the
Act,” the EEOC.137
Brennan’s dissent began by comparing the EEOC’s argument in its brief as
amicus curiae with the response of the majority. The EEOC believed that
General Electric’s disability plan violated Title VII “because the omission of
pregnancy from the program ha[d] the intent and effect of providing that ‘only
women [were subjected] to a substantial risk of total loss of income because of
temporary medical disability.’”138 The majority, on the other hand, felt that
Title VII had not been violated because “it view[ed] General Electric’s plan as
representing a gender-free assignment of risks in accordance with normal
actuarial techniques.”139 Also, to counter the EEOC’s interpretation of the
purpose of Title VII, the majority wrote extensively about the proper place of
the EEOC decisions in the context of statutory interpretation, particularly that:
[I]n enacting Title VII, [Congress] did not confer upon the EEOC authority to
promulgate rules or regulations pursuant to that Title. This does not mean that
EEOC guidelines are not entitled to consideration in determining legislative
intent. But it does mean that the courts properly may accord less weight to
such guidelines than to administrative regulations which Congress has declared
shall have the force of law.140

In response to this, Justice Brennan concluded that the correctness of the
Court’s opinion, and the determination of the proper “conceptual framework”
through which to interpret Title VII rested in a two-fold analysis. First, Justice
Brennan addressed the “soundness of the Court’s underlying assumption that
the plan is the untainted product of a gender-neutral risk assignment
process.”141 He concluded that this assumption, based on the “historical
backdrop of General Electric’s employment practices,”142 as well as “the
existence or nonexistence of gender-free policies governing the inclusion of

136. Id.
137. Id. at 146-47.
138. Id. at 147 (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
at 12, Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (No. 74-1589)).
139. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 at 147.
140. Id. at 141 (citations omitted). A large part of Gilbert’s majority opinion and Brennan’s
dissent was devoted to the EEOC’s position and its guidelines in Gilbert. The majority and
dissent disagreed on the extent to which the EEOC decisions and guidelines should have shaped
and influenced the Court when answering this question. While this was significant in Gilbert, it
played less of a role in Erickson.
141. Id. at 148 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
142. Id.
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compensable risks,”143 was “purely fanciful.”144 Second, Justice Brennan
addressed the question of whether “the resulting pattern of risks insured by
General Electric can then be evaluated in terms of the broad social objectives
promoted by Title VII.”145 By viewing Gilbert in terms of whether it satisfied
the goals of Title VII, Brennan concluded that “the EEOC’s interpretation that
the exclusion of pregnancy from a disability insurance plan is incompatible
with the overall objectives of Title VII has been unjustifiably rejected.”146
Getting to the core of the issue, Justice Brennan’s dissent examined the
acts of General Electric in the contexts of disparate treatment and disparate
impact under Title VII. First, under disparate treatment, Justice Brennan
criticized the majority’s reliance on Geduldig, commenting that Geduldig
could apply to Gilbert only in its determination “that a pregnancy classification
standing alone cannot be said to fall into the category of classifications that rest
explicitly on ‘gender as such.’”147 The dissent remarked that “it offend[ed]
common sense to suggest . . . that a classification revolving around pregnancy
is not, at the minimum, strongly ‘sex related.’”148 In addition, Justice Brennan
looked to the central question in Geduldig, which was “whether the exclusion
of a sex-linked disability . . . was actually a product of neutral, persuasive
actuarial considerations, or rather stemmed from a policy that purposefully
downgraded women’s role in the labor force.”149 In Geduldig, Justice Brennan
noted that, since the defendant was the State of California, it received “the
normal presumption favoring legislative action” in Equal Protection Clause
challenges.150 However, first, in Gilbert, the defendant was a private company
being sued under Title VII, not a state being challenged under the Fourteenth
Amendment.151 Second:
[T]he Court simply disregards a history of General Electric practices that have
served to undercut the employment opportunities of women who become
pregnant while employed. Moreover, the Court studiously ignores the
undisturbed conclusion of the District Court that General Electric’s
“discriminatory attitude” toward women was a “motivating factor in its
policy,” and that the pregnancy exclusion was “neutral (neither) on its face”
nor “in its intent.”152

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 at 148.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 148-49.
Id. at 149.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 149.
Id. (citing Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 495 (1974)).
Id.
Id. at 149-50 (citations omitted).
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Justice Brennan also criticized the decision of the majority based on the
assertion that pregnancy differs from other disabilities due to its “voluntary”
nature.153 The district court found that pregnancy was “often a voluntarily
undertaken and desired condition,” to which the majority felt marked a
distinction between pregnancy and the other disabilities covered in General
Electric’s plan.154 Justice Brennan, however, felt that the “voluntary”
distinction was not persuasive, “for as the Court of Appeals correctly noted,
‘other than for childbirth disability, [General Electric] had never construed its
plan as eliminating all so-called “voluntary” disabilities,’ including sport
injuries, attempted suicides, venereal disease, disabilities incurred in the
commission of a crime or during a fight, and elective cosmetic surgery.”155
While not devoting a large portion of its opinion to this concept, the Court felt
that this was another reason General Electric’s exclusion was not a “pretext for
discriminating against women.”156 Interestingly, this same argument was also
asserted by the defendant in Erickson and was rejected by the court.157
Justice Brennan then utilized the “framework” explicated in Geduldig to
counter the Court’s arguments in Gilbert. The Geduldig court stated that
“‘[t]here is no risk from which men are protected and women are not . . . [and]
no risk from which women are protected and men are not.’”158 As Justice
Brennan pointed out, however, General Electric’s disability plan covered risks
such as “prostatectomies, vasectomies, and circumcisions that are specific to
the reproductive system of men and for which there exist no female
counterparts covered by the plan.”159 This left pregnancy to be “the only
disability, sex-specific or otherwise, that is excluded from coverage.”160 This
finding prompted Brennan to suggest that the Court’s belief that the plan was
based on “a mere underinclusive assignment of risks in a sex-neutral
fashion”161 as being “simplistic and misleading.”162 Ultimately, Brennan
agreed with the District Court’s holding that “General Electric’s
‘discriminatory attitude’ toward women was ‘a motivating factor in its
policy’163 and that the pregnancy exclusion was ‘neutral neither on its face’ nor
153. Id. at 151.
154. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136 (citing Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 377 (E.D.
Va. 1974)).
155. Id. at 151 (quoting Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661, 665 (4th Cir. 1975)).
156. Id. at 136.
157. See Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1272-73 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
158. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 152 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 150 (quoting Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 383 (E.D.
Va. 1974)) (citation omitted).
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‘in its intent.’”164 Clearly, to Justice Brennan, General Electric had
discriminated against its female employees under the disparate treatment
theory of Title VII.
Justice Brennan then analyzed the Court’s decision under the disparate
impact theory. He particularly urged the Court to apply the legal theory of
disparate impact in violation of Title VII that each of the appellate courts had
previously applied when dealing with this issue: that “a prima facie violation
of Title VII . . . [could be] established by demonstrating that a facially neutral
classification has the effect of discriminating against members of a defined
class.”165 Justice Brennan noted three distinct discriminatory effects of
General Electric’s coverage exclusion: (1) “the plan covers all disabilities that
mutually afflict both sexes;”166 (2) the plan insures against all disabilities that
are male-specific or have a predominant impact on males;”167 and (3) “all
female-specific and female-impacted disabilities are covered, except for the
most prevalent, pregnancy.”168 Brennan then concluded that the Court
incorrectly focused on only the first effect of General Electric’s plan, while the
EEOC aimed to prevent “the unequal exclusion manifested in effects two and
three,” which represented a disparate impact on women in violation of Title
VII.169
This disparity between the Court and its dissenting justices over which
discriminatory effects were to be recognized led Brennan and Marshall to
depart from their majority counterparts. Brennan and Marshall believed that it
was well-settled law170 that “a prima facie violation of Title VII, whether under
[theories of disparate treatment or disparate impact], also is established by
demonstrating that a facially neutral classification has the effect of
discriminating against members of a defined class.”171 The dissent arguments
provided a helpful framework not only for the PDA, but also cases following
it, including Erickson.

164. Id. (quoting Gilbert, 375 F. Supp. at 382).
165. Id. at 155.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 155.
169. Id. In Gilbert, Justice Brennan also discussed the reasons why the EEOC regulations
should be followed. Id. at 155-59.
170. Id. at 154. Brennan felt that it was particularly well settled due to the findings of the six
appellate courts, which accepted a position opposite to the majority’s.
171. Id.
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A Legislative Response: The PDA Amendment to Title VII

In a direct response to the Supreme Court holding in Gilbert,172 Congress
decided it was time to clarify what the Title VII prohibition against sex
discrimination was meant to do173 and redefined the scope of the law by redefining “sex discrimination” in Title VII.174 The PDA added the following
language to Title VII:
(k) The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other
persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work . . . .175

Unlike the absence of legislative history elaborating on the scope and
proper application of sex discrimination under the 1964 version of Title VII,176
the PDA did have accompanying legislative history to explain the
Congressional intent and purpose for adopting the law. A large part of that
history came directly from Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion in Gilbert.
Congress’ purpose for the PDA was to “clarify [its] intent to include
discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions in
the prohibition against sex discrimination in employment.”177 The House
Report discussing the creation of the PDA showed that the law was created not
to “reflect [a] new legislative mandate of the Congress . . . . [but] to eradicate
confusion by expressly broadening the definition of sex discrimination in Title
VII to include pregnancy-based discrimination . . . [and] to clarify its original
intent.”178 With the PDA, Congress was restating its intent behind Title VII,
and assisting the Supreme Court to get back on track with the legislative intent
172. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 675-76
(1983); H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4750.
173. The PDA would provide an opportunity for the 1978 Congress to show its intent for Title
VII sex discrimination. The intent of the 1964 Congress with regard to sex discrimination under
Title VII is unclear, due largely to the lack of legislative history. See supra note 65. Congress
felt that the Supreme Court reached the wrong result in Gilbert, and, therefore, Congress wanted
to set the courts straight by stating its vision of prohibited sex discrimination.
174. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000). See also Newport News Shipbuilding, 462 U.S. at 678;
Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1269-70 (W.D. Wash. 2001); H.R. REP. NO.
95-948, at 1-18.
175. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
176. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act was created to solidify, explain and make consistent
the judicial interpretation of the Title VII sex discrimination. Indeed, the PDA itself does much
to explain the intent of Title VII, and the legislative history of the PDA only helps interpreters to
allow the law to reach its full potential. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-948 at 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4750.
177. Id. at 1.
178. Id. at 3.
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for the law.179 This tweaking of Title VII, Congress asserted, was to limit
confusion regarding its policy on sex discrimination in the workplace and to
prevent “an intolerable potential trend in employment practices.”180
Part of the problem with Gilbert was the extent to which the Court needed
to interpret “sex discrimination”—a difficult task, particularly in light of the
lack of legislative history of “sex discrimination” in Title VII. Accordingly,
the PDA was created to reduce the amount of interpretation necessary in the
courts, thereby reducing both the discretion of the courts and, as the result of
such discretion,181 problematic holdings such as Gilbert. This was a necessary
clarification, because “the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretations of Title VII
tend[ed] to erode our national policy of nondiscrimination in employment.”182
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC marked one of the
first judicial applications of the newly adopted PDA amendment to Title
VII.183 Prior to the PDA, Newport News’ plan provided equal coverage for
pregnancy-related hospitalizations of female employees and spouses of male
employees; this coverage, however, was limited in comparison to all other
hospitalizations covered by the plan.184 After the employer made adjustments
to its benefits plan in compliance with the PDA, female employees were
provided coverage for their pregnancy-related hospitalizations without the
prior limitation.185 The spouses of male employees, however, were subject to a
limitation of coverage of 100% of reasonable and customary delivery and
anesthesiologist charges, and $500 for the hospital stay, marking a discrepancy
in treatment of Newport News’ female employees and the spouses of its male
employees.186
Newport News provided the test central to determining PDA compliance.
“Under the proper test [Newport News’] plan is unlawful because the
protection it affords to married male employees is less comprehensive than the
protection it affords to married female employees.”187 This case marked the
distinction between pre-PDA and post-PDA versions of Title VII. The prePDA holdings such as Gilbert allowed employers to refuse coverage for
exclusively female health care needs, using a unisex definition of
“comprehensive.” For example, Gilbert indicated that if the same coverage
was provided for men and women, then the coverage would not discriminate,

179. Id.; Newport News Shipbuilding, 462 U.S. at 676; Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1269.
180. H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 3.
181. An example of one such result is when the courts interpreted the law in ways not
intended by Congress.
182. H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 3.
183. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
184. Id. at 672.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 672-73.
187. Id. at 676 (emphasis added).
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despite the different sex-based healthcare needs of men and women. This
“unisex” definition allowed for the “additional risk” concept of pregnancy that
was central to Gilbert.188 Post-PDA courts would continue to recognize the
different medical needs of women and men but recognize that, in order to
provide comprehensive benefits to all employees, the plans would have to
provide for sex-based healthcare needs.189
The Supreme Court commented on the use of the “business decision”
excuse available to employers when rebutting a presumption of discriminatory
treatment in one post-PDA case, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.190 In Johnson
Controls, the Court held that the policy of prohibiting women from working in
areas of a battery manufacturing plant that could produce complications in
their fertility and pregnancy was discriminatory under Title VII and the
PDA.191 The employer utilized a cost-based defense, arguing that if the
women allowed to work in these dangerous areas encountered complications in
their fertility or future pregnancies as a result of the materials they encountered
while working, the tort awards these women would garner would greatly
damage the employer.192 In short, if women would be allowed to work near
harmful materials, the resulting tort liability would make it more expensive for
the employer to employ women.193
The employer argued that its tort-liability would be salvaged through the
employer’s prohibition of women working in dangerous areas. This argument
for a business justification warranting discrimination was rejected by the Court
on the grounds that it violated the PDA.194 The employment policy
specifically stated that women “capable of bearing children” would be barred
from working in areas where they could be exposed to lead.195 “Under the
PDA, such a classification must be regarded, for Title VII purposes, in the
same light as explicit sex discrimination. [The employer] has chosen to treat
all of its female employees as potentially pregnant; that choice evinces
discrimination on the basis of sex.”196 Finally, the Johnson Controls Court
clarified that the employment policy at bar should have been analyzed under
the disparate treatment framework and not the disparate impact theory since it
188. See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
189. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 677-78 (1983).
190. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
191. Id. at 204-05.
192. Id. at 210-11.
193. Id.
194. Id. Note that this determination also included consideration of “sex” as a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ), which requires certain particular defenses to it; this topic falls
far outside the scope of this note. For the purpose of this Note, Johnson Controls brings forth an
example of the pre-1991 Civil Rights Act failure of a “cost” defense to disparate treatment under
Title VII.
195. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 198-99.
196. Id.
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“[was] not neutral because it [did] not apply to the reproductive capacity of the
company’s male employees in the same way as it applie[d] to that of the
females.”197
V. THE FACTS OF ERICKSON
When the Erickson case arose, Jennifer Erickson was twenty-six years old,
married for one year and had just begun her career as a pharmacist at Bartell
Drug Company.198 As a young woman just getting started in her career, she
was not yet ready to begin having children, and she prevented pregnancy with
the most common form of reversible birth control, oral contraceptive pills.199
After Bartell’s employee prescription drug plan refused Erickson’s initial
request for coverage of her oral contraceptives, she wrote to the benefits
department requesting a change in the plan, but she was once again denied.200
197. Id. The Court went on to recognize the premise in Title VII jurisprudence that “the
absence of a malevolent motive does not convert a facially discriminatory policy into a neutral
policy with a discriminatory effect. . . . Nor did the arguably benign motives lead to consideration
of a business necessity defense.” Id. at 199. It should be noted that this use of a cost-based
business necessity defense in a disparate treatment action in Johnson Controls pre-dated the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 that flatly prohibited this defense in this context, but for cases involving a
bona fide occupational qualification. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(k)(2) (2000).
198. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 9-10, Erickson (No. C00-1213L).
199. Kelly Dowhower Karpa, For Women Only, DRUG TOPICS, Jan. 15, 2001, at 51. “Of U.S.
women using contraception, 17% reportedly rely upon [oral contraceptive pills] . . . .” Id. at 51.
Law’s article suggests otherwise, that OCP’s are used by “twenty-seven percent of women who
practice contraception in the United States.” Sylvia A. Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance
for Contraception, 73 WASH. L. REV. 363, 369 (1998) (citing Linda J. Piccinino & William D.
Mosher, Trends in Contraceptive Use in the United States: 1982 – 1995, 30 FAM. PLAN. PERS. 4,
4-5 (1998)). Regardless of which figure is correct, the birth control pill is the choice
contraceptive device for women trying to prevent pregnancy.
Ms. Erickson recently testified before the Senate Committee on Health, Education,
Labor and Pensions to urge Congress to improve coverage for contraception:
I consider myself in many ways a typical American woman. My husband Scott and I
have been married for two years. We both have full time jobs in the Seattle area and are
working hard to save money. We recently bought our first house and we spent a lot of
time this summer painting and fixing it up.
My husband and I are both looking forward to starting a family. However, we want
to be adequately prepared for the financial and emotional challenges of parenting.
Someday when we feel ready, Scott and I would like to have one or two children.
But we know we could not cope with having twelve to fifteen children, which is the
average number of children women would have during their lives without access to
contraception. So I, like millions of other women, need and use safe, effective
prescription contraception.
Improving Women’s Health: Why Contraceptive Insurance Coverage Matters?: Hearing Before
the Senate Committee on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of
Jennifer Erickson, Class Representative, Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266
(W.D. Wash. 2001)).
200. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 11, Erickson (No. C00-1213L).
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Finally, after filing a charge with the EEOC in late 1999 and receiving a rightto-sue letter, Erickson filed suit in the Western District of Washington with
only an EEOC decision201 and a cognizable interpretation of Title VII – though
not yet established in common law or statute – on her side.202
Erickson did not make her claim solely for herself, but also as the class
representative in a class action suit, the members consisting of female, nonunion Bartell employees.203 Surely she realized that this victory would have a
much more widespread effect, warranting employers nationwide to think twice
about their prescription plans, and leading women to once again reconsider
their rights, their “realized” equality and their conditions in the workplace. It
would also prompt female employees and their employers to re-assess the
possible discriminatory effects of their employment policies and benefit plans.
One could imagine that, as a pharmacist, Mrs. Erickson was reminded on a
daily basis of the effects of the injustices of discriminatory employer-based
prescription plans for all women. It is highly probable that Ms. Erickson
commonly encountered patients with the same complaint that she pursued in
Erickson.204
The court’s holding in Erickson responded to the parties’ cross motions for
summary judgment. Erickson claimed that Bartell violated Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,205 as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
201. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Decision on Coverage of
Contraception, (Dec. 14, 2000), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/decisioncontraception.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2002).
202. See generally id.; Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 12, Erickson (No. C00-1213L).
203. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 4, Erickson (No. C00-1213L).
204. In her testimony during a Senate hearing, Ms. Erickson commented on her perspective as
a pharmacist on employers’ refusals to cover contraceptives:
Personally, it was very disappointing for me [to find that my employer did not cover
prescription contraceptives], since contraception is my most important, ongoing health
need at this time. For many women, it may be the only prescription she needs. But it was
also troubling to me professionally, as a health care provider. . . .
Contraception is one of the most common prescriptions I fill for women. I am often
the person who has the difficult job of telling a woman that her insurance plan will not
cover contraceptives. It is an unenviable and frustrating position to be in, because the
woman is often upset and disappointed, and I am unable to give her an acceptable
explanation. . . .
....
I finally got tired of telling women “no this one prescription your insurance won’t
cover.” So I took the bold step of bringing a lawsuit against my employer to challenge its
unfair policy. I did it not just for me, but for the other women who work at my company
who are not so fortunate.
Improving Women’s Health: Why Contraceptive Insurance Coverage Matters?: Hearing Before
the Senate Committee on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of
Jennifer Erickson, Class Representative, Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266
(W.D. Wash 2001)).
205. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1268 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2).
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of 1978,206 under two theories of discrimination: disparate treatment and
disparate impact.207 Though this was a Title VII case, there was less
discussion of the plaintiff’s prima facie burden or the framework set forth in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green208 and more of an effort to justify the
court’s alignment of Erickson with prior Supreme Court decisions on sex
discrimination.
Though the court in Erickson turned to prior case law instead of
performing an independent disparate treatment analysis, Erickson’s arguments
are important because they elucidate the employee’s position and also work
against Bartell’s defenses to sex discrimination. Under its theory of disparate
treatment, or intentional discrimination, Erickson made two arguments. First,
she noted the disparity of coverage between preventative medications and
treatments that were included and excluded in the prescription plan.
Specifically, Bartell refused to cover prescription contraceptives in its
“employee benefit plan while including benefits for other preventative medical
services, including other preventative prescription medications and devices.”209
Erickson then argued that Bartell’s exclusion applies only to females, because
males did not use the contraceptive drugs and devices excluded from the plan.
“Prescription contraception, which is available for use only by women, is basic
medical care for women who have the potential to become pregnant but who
wish to control that potential by reversible means.”210 In connecting these two
arguments, Erickson concluded that “[t]he failure to provide coverage for
prescription contraception treat[ed] medication needed for a pregnancy-related
condition less favorably than medication needed for other medical
conditions”211 and evidenced disparate treatment of Bartell’s female
employees.
Erickson’s argument under the disparate impact theory—or unintentional
discrimination—was similar to the disparate treatment argument. Put simply
in the complaint, “[b]ecause prescription contraceptives are available for use
only by women, Bartell’s failure to provide coverage for prescription
contraception forces its female employees to choose between paying their own
out-of-pocket prescription costs, or bearing the physical, emotional and
financial costs of unplanned pregnancy.”212 Even if there could be shown no
subjective intent of Bartell to discriminate against its female employees, a
206. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)). The Pregnancy Discrimination Act amended Title
VII to confirm that discrimination based on sex also included discrimination based on pregnancy.
207. Id. at 1268 n.2.
208. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
209. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 2, Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266
(W.D. Wash. 2001) (No. C00-1213L) (emphasis added).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 3.
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showing under Title VII that Bartell’s prescription plan exclusion worked to
“limit, segregate, or classify his employees . . . in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual’s . . . sex,” would lead the court to find that Bartell’s prescription
plan was discriminatory.213
Bartell sought summary judgment in its favor on the same claims214 and
posited numerous arguments in its defense including:
(1) treating contraceptives differently from other prescription drugs is
reasonable in that contraceptives are voluntary, preventative, do not
treat or prevent an illness or disease, and are not truly a “healthcare”
issue;
(2) control of one’s fertility is not “pregnancy, childbirth or related
medical conditions” as those terms are used in the PDA;
(3) employers must be permitted to control the costs of employment
benefits by limiting the scope of coverage;
(4) the exclusion of all “family planning” drugs and devices is facially
neutral;
(5) in the thirty-seven years Title VII has been on the books, no court
has found that excluding contraceptives constitutes sex
discrimination; and
(6) this issue should be determined by the legislature, rather than the
courts.215

The Erickson court began its discussion by retracing the legislative history
of Title VII and the PDA.216 The court held for Erickson and against Bartell
on the first count of disparate treatment in violation of Title VII and as a result
did not elaborate on the plaintiff’s second claim of disparate impact or the
defendant’s defense to it.217 In holding for Erickson, the court stated first that
“[m]ale and female employees have different, sex-based disability and
healthcare needs, and the law is no longer blind to the fact that only women
can get pregnant, bear children, or use prescription contraception.”218 Even if
Bartell denied coverage of contraceptives without an intent to discriminate
against women, the court noted that an employer’s decision to cover all drugs
and devices, except a few, created a legal obligation for that employer under
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2000).
Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1268 n.2.
Id. at 1272.
Id. at 1269-71.
Id. at 1277.
Id. at 1271.
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Title VII219 to ensure that the otherwise comprehensive benefits plan would
“provide[] equally comprehensive coverage for both sexes,”220 and also would
“not discriminate based on sex-based characteristics.”221 Since a large number
of the excluded drugs and devices from Bartell’s plan would only be prescribed
to women, the plan was deemed facially discriminatory, showing disparate
treatment of male and female employees covered under Bartell’s prescription
drug plan.
A.

Disparate Treatment in the Context of Erickson

Erickson’s disparate treatment claim centered on the premise of the PDA
that pregnancy discrimination is equivalent to sex discrimination.222 Erickson
claimed:
Contraception is “pregnancy-related” within the meaning of the PDA because
it is medical treatment that provides women with the ability to control their
biological potential for pregnancy. Exclusion of contraception from a health
plan is sex discrimination in violation of the PDA because it treats women
differently on the basis of their potential to become pregnant. The exclusion of
contraception from [Bartell’s plan] is, therefore, sex discrimination on its face
in violation of Title VII, as amended by the PDA.223

As a case of first impression, Erickson’s facts differed from those of any prior
case and presented a new focus through which the courts could recognize and
analyze Title VII sex discrimination.224 While Erickson involved the exclusion
of coverage for contraceptive drugs and devices,225 prior cases focused on the
refusal to cover the disabling effects of pregnancy.226 Nonetheless, the
Western District of Washington examined Erickson in terms of the legal

219. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1272.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. For a more extensive discussion of the PDA, see infra notes 175-85 and accompanying
text. For the purposes of analyzing Erickson’s disparate treatment claim and Bartell’s response
thereto, it is necessary to understand that the PDA helped to define “sex discrimination” in Title
VII by including decisions based on “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions” with
regard to both medical benefits plans and benefits for disability due to pregnancy. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(k) (2000).
223. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 39, Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d
1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (No. C00-1213L).
224. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Newport News Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
225. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1268.
226. See, e.g., Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 125; Newport News Shipbuilding, 462 U.S. at 672-73
(holding that spouses of male employees are entitled to the same coverage for pregnancy-related
disabilities as were female employees; the PDA did extend to the spouses of employees and not
just employees themselves).
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principles established by Gilbert and the PDA.227 The court noted, “[a]lthough
this litigation involves an exclusion for prescription contraceptives rather than
an exclusion for pregnancy-related disability costs, the legal principles
established by Gilbert and its legislative reversal [by the PDA] govern the
outcome of this case.”228 Particularly, the court noted that under the Gilbert
requirements, because Bartell’s plan involved “no risk from which men [were]
protected and women [were] not,” Bartell’s plan shared the same “facial
parity” as General Electric’s plan had in Gilbert.229
However, much had changed in the law between Gilbert, decided in 1976,
and Erickson. Instead of focusing on Gilbert, Erickson was appropriately
based on more current law, specifically, the PDA and two tenets of law
reaffirmed by it—“relative comprehensiveness of coverage” and “sex-based
classifications” for coverage.230 The first tenet, relative comprehensive
coverage, as explicated by Newport News, was that “equality under Title VII
[was] measured by evaluating the relative comprehensiveness of coverage
offered to the sexes . . . .”231 The Erickson court focused on the actual
disparity of comprehensive coverage benefits between men and women instead
of the deceptively “sex-neutral” identical lists of treatment for men and women
that provided the facial parity upon which Gilbert was based.232 “Male and
female employees have different, sex-based disability and healthcare needs,
and the law is no longer blind to the fact that only women can get pregnant,
bear children, or use prescription contraception.”233 The court decided,
accordingly, that this tenet should apply to coverage for prescription
contraception no differently than it applies to coverage for costs associated
with pregnancy itself.
The second tenet of the PDA, “that discrimination based on any sex-based
characteristic is sex discrimination,”234 was described in UAW v. Johnson
Controls, Inc.,235 which further explained “that classifying employees on the
basis of their childbearing capacity, regardless of whether they are, in fact,
pregnant, is sex-based discrimination.”236 Furthermore, the Erickson court
noted “[t]he special or increased healthcare needs associated with a woman’s
unique sex-based characteristics must be met to the same extent, and on the

227. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1270.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1270-71 (quoting Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 135 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S.
484, 496-97 (1974))).
230. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000). See Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1270-71.
231. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1271.
232. Id. at 1271. See also Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138-40.
233. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1271.
234. Id.
235. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
236. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1271 (citing Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 197-98).
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same terms, as other healthcare needs.”237 Therefore, Bartell’s plan caused
disparate treatment of its female employees as prohibited under Title VII.
Regardless of whether Bartell’s plan was intentionally discriminatory (and
the court doubted this intention),238 it did, on its face, discriminate against
women due to the facts that, first, the plan was not comprehensive for the
specific health care needs of women (it was not relatively comprehensive),239
and, second, Bartell’s choice of exclusions followed the lines of sex-based
needs (it was based on a sex-based classification).240 Ultimately, after
reviewing “the legislative history of Title VII and the PDA, the language of the
statute itself, and the relevant case law,”241 the court found Bartell’s
prescription plan exclusions to be “inconsistent with the requirements of
federal law.”242
B.

Bartell’s Defenses to Disparate Treatment: Same Exclusions for Female
Employees and Dependants; Facial Neutrality

In response to Erickson’s claim of disparate treatment, Bartell argued that
“its prescription plan [was] not discriminatory because the female dependants
of male employees [were] subject to the same exclusions as [were] female
employees.”243 Particularly, Bartell argued that the prescription contraceptive
drugs and devices were excluded since they belonged to the “family planning”
classification prescriptions, all of which were excluded from the plan.244 Since
all family planning drugs such as infertility drugs and contraceptives were
excluded, according to Bartell, this resulted in a facially neutral provision.245
However, the court noted that no specific family planning exclusion was
stated in the plan, and further, other drugs that could be classified as family

237. Id.
238. Id. at 1271-72 n.7. Erickson doubts that the plan was intentional in its discrimination
against women:
The most reasonable explanation for the current state of affairs is that the exclusion of
women-only benefits is merely an unquestioned holdover from a time when employmentrelated benefits were doled out less equitably than they [were] today. The lack of
evidence of bad faith or malice toward women does not affect the validity of plaintiffs’
Title VII claim. Where a benefit plan is discriminatory on its face, no inquiry into
subjective intent is necessary.
Id. (citing Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris,
463 U.S. 1073, 1080-86 (1983)).
239. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1271-72.
240. Id. at 1272.
241. Id. at 1271.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1272 n.8.
244. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1275.
245. Id. at 1272.
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planning, such as prenatal vitamins, were covered.246 The court ultimately
rejected Bartell’s facial neutrality argument because:
First, discriminating against a protected class cannot be justified through
consistency. Second, Bartell ignore[d] the clear import of Congress’
repudiation of Gilbert: a policy which use[d] sex-based characteristics to limit
benefits, thereby creating a plan which [was] less comprehensive for one sex
than the other, violate[d] Title VII.247

The court also responded that even if there was a family planning exclusion,
and assuming that the exclusion of infertility drugs affects the sexes without
parity, this particular exclusion of contraceptives in Erickson still affected
women much more than men, and was still discriminatory.248
[T]here is at least an argument that the exclusion of infertility drugs applie[d]
equally to male and female employees, making the coverage offered to all
employees less comprehensive in roughly the same amount and manner. The
additional exclusion of prescription contraceptives, however, reduces the
comprehensiveness of the coverage offered to female employees while leaving
the coverage offered to male employees unchanged.249

Ultimately, Bartell was unable to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for its exclusion of coverage for contraceptive drugs and devices. This
was enough for the Erickson court to conclude that Bartell’s plan discriminated
against its female employees. Bartell’s use of the “facial neutrality”250
defense, however, cuts against the employer since the concept is often a
characteristic of (note, not a defense to) claims of disparate impact.
C. Disparate Impact in the Context of Erickson
Erickson’s argument of disparate impact in violation of Title VII was also
based on the PDA amendment of Title VII. Erickson alleged:
The exclusion of contraception from [Bartell’s plan] also [had] an adverse
disparate impact on women in violation of Title VII because it force[d] them
either to pay for prescription contraceptives out of pocket, despite having

246. Id. at 1275.
247. Id. at 1272 n.8.
248. Id. at 1275.
249. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1275.
250. Id. at 1274-75. The defendant was in a truly tough position in Erickson. While Bartell
needed to contend that its policy exclusion was facially neutral to rebut the intentional
discrimination allegation, this contention would, at the same time, help Erickson prove her case
of disparate impact since most disparate impact cases are characterized by facially neutral
employment practices. The court found that the plan was not facially neutral and, instead, was
discriminatory on its face, so Bartell ended up losing on the issue of disparate treatment. See id.
at 1275. However, the court’s discussion appears to imply that there was also a claim of disparate
impact despite the lack of facial neutrality in the policy, as facial neutrality is not an absolute
statutory requirement to a finding of disparate treatment. See 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-2(k)(1) (2000).
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prescription insurance coverage, or to bear the physical, emotional and
financial burdens of unplanned pregnancy. Bartell’s policy of excluding
contraceptive coverage [could not] be justified as job-related and consistent
with business necessity.251

The 1991 Civil Rights Act added the prima facie requirements for disparate
impact to Title VII, requiring that a claimant show that his or her employer
utilized “a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the [employer] fails to
demonstrate that the challenged practice is . . . consistent with business
necessity.”252 But, as stated in International Brotherhood of Teamsters, a
disparate impact claim typically “involve[s] employment practices that are
facially neutral.”253 As we have seen in the discussion of the disparate
treatment theory under Title VII, Bartell’s policy was not facially neutral and
did exhibit disparate treatment in its classification of benefit exclusions based
on sex as well as its lack of relative comprehensiveness.254 For these reasons
Erickson did not directly discuss the plaintiff’s allegation of disparate impact
since a finding of disparate treatment rendered it moot. However, the court did
discuss Bartell’s defense to disparate impact: that the plan was justified by a
business decision to control costs.255
D. Bartell’s Defense to Disparate Impact: Business Decision to Control
Costs
Bartell argued that “it should be permitted to limit the scope of its
employee benefit programs in order to control costs.”256 However, it is well
settled law that “cost is not . . . a defense to allegations of discrimination under
Title VII.”257 This concept was codified by the Civil Rights Act of 1991: the
employer must show “that the challenged practice is job related for the position
in question and consistent with business necessity.”258 Bartell failed to satisfy
either of these statutory requirements.

251. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 40, Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d
1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (No. C00-1213L).
252. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
253. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 (1977) (emphasis added).
254. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1271-72. See supra notes 20-30 and accompanying text.
255. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1274.
256. Id.
257. Id. (quoting City of Los Angeles, Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
716-18 (1978) (policy requiring female employees to contribute more to pension plan than their
male counterparts, based on the assumption that women cost more than men to insure, violated
Title VII)). See UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 210 (1991). See also, 29 C.F.R.
§1604.9(e) (2000).
258. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2000) (emphasis added).
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In addition, though typically utilized as a defense to disparate impact, the
1991 Civil Rights Act also made clear that “business necessity” fails in the
disparate treatment arena. Cost controlling devices that an employer attributes
to a business necessity, regarding “[a] demonstration that an employment
practice is required by business necessity, may not be used as a defense against
a claim of intentional discrimination . . . .”259
Furthermore, in its Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, the
EEOC stated that “[i]t shall not be a defense under Title VII to a charge of sex
discrimination in benefits that the cost of such benefits is greater with respect
to one sex than the other.”260 An important distinction should be made here in
order to better understand the legal statement made by Erickson: although cost
was not a defense to Title VII violations,261 Erickson recognized that entities
were free to assert control of the scope of their enterprise, so long as the
method to “curb costs” was not discriminatory. 262 Particularly, the court stated
that
Title VII does not require employers to offer any particular type or
category of benefit. However, when an employer decides to offer a
prescription plan covering everything except a few specifically excluded drugs
and devices, it has a legal obligation to make sure that the resulting plan does
not discriminate based on sex-based characteristics and that it provides equally
comprehensive coverage for both sexes.263

Nonetheless, the court recognized that “Bartell offer[ed] its employees an
admittedly generous package of healthcare benefits, including both third-party
healthcare plans and an in-house prescription program” and that “[t]he cost
savings Bartell realize[d] by excluding prescription contraceptives from its
healthcare plans [were] being directly borne by only one sex in violation of
Title VII.”264 Therefore, if somehow disparate treatment was not proven, and
disparate impact was, Bartell’s defense of “cost,” in terms of a “business
necessity” issue, would have been rejected by the court. “Even if one were to
assume that Bartell’s prescription plan was not the result of intentional
discrimination, the exclusion of women-only benefits from a generally
comprehensive prescription plan is sex discrimination under Title VII.”265 In

259. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(2) (emphasis added).
260. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(e). For a discussion of the cost defense in terms of disparate impact
cases, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(2). See also supra notes 138-46 and accompanying text.
261. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 210; Manhart, 435 U.S. at 716-18. The “cost defense” to
disparate treatment is handled in case law; however cost, in terms of business necessity is rejected
as a defense to disparate impact in Title VII language. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(2).
262. Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1274 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
263. Id. at 1272 (citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669,
676 (1983).
264. Id. at 1274.
265. Id. at 1271-72.
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addition, there was no showing that the exclusion was, in any way “job related
for the position in question.”266 This showing, in addition to a satisfactory
showing of “business necessity,” would be necessary for a finding in favor of
Bartell on the disparate impact claim.267 Without going into a detailed analysis
of disparate impact under Title VII, the Erickson court suggested that even if
Erickson had not proved her disparate treatment claim, a disparate impact
claim could have also secured her victory.
E.

The PDA in the Context of Erickson

As noted in the discussion of Erickson’s finding of disparate treatment, the
court relied largely on the PDA in its analysis. Erickson also contributed to
Title VII jurisprudence by interpreting the PDA to include conditions and
treatment prior to impregnation, and not just pregnancy itself. “Read in the
context of Title VII as a whole, it is a broad acknowledgement of the intent of
Congress to outlaw any and all discrimination against any and all women in the
terms and conditions of their employment, including the benefits an employer
provides to its employees.”268 This was an interpretation that Bartell flatly
disputed.
F.

Bartell’s Defense to PDA Applicability
1.

Incorrect Interpretation of the Scope of the PDA

Bartell argued that the PDA did not discuss discrimination in terms of
pregnancy prevention, and its exclusion of prescription contraceptives thereby
did not violate the PDA.269 Particularly, Bartell argued that the exclusion of
prescription contraceptives did not fall under the umbrella of “pregnancy,
childbirth or related medical conditions,” to trigger PDA applicability.270 In
other words, Bartell relied on the assertion that control of one’s fertility, what
Erickson sought, was “not ‘pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions’ as those terms are used in the PDA.”271 While the court conceded
that the PDA did not specifically comment on prescription contraceptives, it
did note that “the decision to exclude drugs made for women from a generally
comprehensive prescription plan is sex discrimination under Title VII, with or

266. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A )(i) (2000).
267. See id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). Or, in the alternative, Bartell’s defense to disparate impact
would fail if “the complaining party makes the demonstration described in subparagraph (C) with
respect to an alternative employment practice and the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative
employment practice.” Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
268. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1271.
269. Id. at 1274.
270. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)).
271. Id. at 1272.
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without the clarification provided by the PDA.”272 In addition, Erickson found
that “regardless of whether the prevention of pregnancy falls within the phrase
‘pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions,’ Congress’ decisive
overruling of [Gilbert], evidence[d] an interpretation of Title VII which
necessarily preclude[d] the choices Bartell [made].”273 The Erickson court also
replied that “the relevant issue”274 was whether Title VII was violated
regardless of the definition of “sex” (either from the PDA or pre-PDA) used;
this was a settled issue to the court, again, because Bartell’s plan constituted a
classification by sex and lacked relative comprehensiveness in coverage for
sex-based medical needs.275
2.

Contraceptives Not a Health Care Need

Bartell’s most provocative argument, however, was that its refusal to cover
“prescription contraceptive devices is not a violation of Title VII because . . .
treating contraceptives differently from other prescription drugs [was]
reasonable in that contraceptives are voluntary, preventative, [did] not treat or
prevent an illness or disease, and [was] not truly a ‘healthcare’ issue.”276 The
court framed its response to this defense around two ideas: (1) the similarity of
fertility control to other diseases treated by prescription medications;277 and (2)
the “irrelevant distinction” of the preventative nature of contraceptives.278
First, the court recognized that “[a]n underlying theme in Bartell’s
argument is that a woman’s ability to control her fertility differs from the type
of illness and disease normally treated with prescription drugs in such
significant respects that it is permissible to treat prescription contraceptives
differently than all other prescription medicines.”279 It noted, however, that a
similar distinction was made in the majority opinion of Gilbert.280 The court
clearly disagreed with this distinction, and cited to many sociological reports in
its argument that unintended pregnancies “carry enormous costs and health
consequences for the mother, the child, and society as a whole.”281
Furthermore, the court felt that “[t]he availability of a reliable, affordable way
to prevent unintended pregnancies would go a long way toward ameliorating
the ills [associated therewith].”282

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Id. at 1274.
Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1274.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1272.
Id.
Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1273.
Id. at 1272.
Id. at 1272 n.9.
Id. at 1273.
Id. at 1273.
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Finally, the court determined that Bartell’s argument that prescription
contraception was of a “preventative nature” was “irrelevant” because “Bartell
cover[ed] a number of preventative drugs under its plan.”283 This was a
“distinction without a difference” because “[p]rescription contraceptives, like
all other preventative drugs, help the recipient avoid unwanted physical
changes.”284 Furthermore, due to the fact that “obtaining an effective method
of contraception is a primary healthcare issue throughout much of a woman’s
life,”285 the court found that any “distinction[] that can be drawn between
prescription contraceptives and . . . other prescription drugs,”286 would not be
“substantive or otherwise justif[y] the exclusion of contraceptives from a
generally comprehensive healthcare plan.”287
G. Bartell’s Legislative Arguments
Finally, Bartell set forth two arguments endorsing a rigid legal system, and
these arguments replicated the state of the legal system at the time of Gilbert.
Bartell essentially asked the court “why now” and questioned Erickson’s
interpretation of Title VII.
1.

New Interpretation of an Old Law

Bartell argued that Title VII had been law for thirty-seven years, and it
seemed questionable that the court was formulating this holding at this point
and not sooner.288 The court’s reply was simple. “[U]ntil this case, no court
had been asked to evaluate the common practice of excluding contraceptives
from a generally comprehensive health plan under Title VII.”289 Furthermore,
the Erickson court, when faced with this question, was “constitutionally
required to rule on the issue before it.”290
In addition, while the judicial system had never before been faced with this
issue, the EEOC had previously made statements to its merit, most recently in
December, 2000.291 The December 2000 EEOC Decision, like Erickson,

283. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1273 (emphasis added). Particularly, Bartell’s plan covered
preventative medications such as “blood-pressure and cholesterol-lowering drugs, hormone
replacement therapies, prenatal vitamins, and drugs to prevent allergic reactions, breast cancer,
and blood clotting.” Id. at 1268 n.1.
284. Id. at 1273.
285. Id. at 1273-74.
286. Id. at 1274.
287. Id.
288. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1275.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 1275-76. See also U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Decision on
Coverage of Contraception, (Dec. 14, 2000), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/decisioncontraception.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2002).
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interpreted the PDA to apply to prescription contraceptives, regardless of the
intended use of those medications.292 The Erickson court could have followed
in the footsteps of Gilbert, and completely discounted the EEOC Decision.293
However, the dissent of Justice Brennan in Gilbert, as affirmed by the
legislative history of the PDA, advocated according more weight to the
EEOC.294 Whether this affirmation encouraged Erickson not to repeat the
mistakes of Gilbert is unclear; more likely, what drew the court’s attention to
the EEOC Decision of December 2000 was its determination that
comprehensive insurance policies that denied prescription contraception
“‘circumscribed the treatment options available to women, but not to men,’”
thereby violating Title VII.295
2.

Legislative Issue

Bartell argued that the legislature, not the judiciary, should be reviewing
this question.296 It is probably the most well settled proposition in American
legal history that “‘[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.’”297 Even though, at the time of Erickson,
“Congress and some state legislatures [were] considering proposals to require
insurance plans to cover prescription contraceptives, that fact [did] not alter
[the] Court’s constitutional role in interpreting Congress’ legislative
enactments in order to resolve private disputes.”298
VI. CRITICAL EVALUATIONS OF ERICKSON V. BARTELL
A.

Erickson’s Argument: Sex Discrimination Under Title VII

Erickson argued that, by its refusal to cover contraceptive drugs and
devices under its otherwise comprehensive prescription drug plan, Bartell
discriminated based on sex, as prohibited under the PDA amendment to Title
VII. Erickson’s mere ability to make her arguments, not to mention her
success in the outcome of the case, was made possible by the long line of cases
and statutes initiated by the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The laws upon which
Erickson relied did not appear overnight but were instead the results of years of
trial and error—seemingly continuous adjustments of the parameters of Title
292. Id.
293. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-46 (1976); see also supra notes 136-40
and accompanying text.
294. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 155-59.
295. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1276 (quoting U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Decision on Coverage of Contraception, (Dec. 14, 2000), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/decision-contraception.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2002)).
296. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1276.
297. Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
298. Id. at 1276.
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VII sex discrimination—in both Congress and in the courts. Clearly, change is
the only constant of Title VII, even after the legislative clarifications achieved
by the PDA and the 1991 Civil Rights Act.
To understand Erickson’s place in the law today requires an understanding
of the concept of “sex discrimination” and an overview of its continual redefinition in the law. This journey began with the determination in Gilbert that,
in effect, pregnancy did not equate to sex, and the disabilities associated with
pregnancy could be excluded on an “additional risks” basis.299 It is an
interesting idea that a woman’s “extra” reproductive organs which allow her to
carry a child and give birth would be construed as “additional,” given that such
organs seem quite fundamental to the definition of “woman.”300 This
permitted discrimination against not all women, but only pregnant ones
reaching their biological potential, in reproductive terms. Justice Brennan’s
dissent revealed that the difference in opinion rested not on whether pregnancy
was “sex related”—clearly it was.301 Instead, the distinction fell upon whether
the Court should equate pregnancy with a disease. It was clearly a medical
condition, but since it could be deemed an intended and favorable medical
condition, did this make it different from other diseases? The Gilbert majority
felt that it did; Justice Brennan and Congress disagreed.
The PDA clarified the intent of Congress that the “sex discrimination” it
included in Title VII also meant “pregnancy discrimination,” since only
women could become pregnant, and, therefore, the condition affected and was
confined to the protected class of women.302 The PDA should not, however,
be viewed as a victory for women—that occurred when “sex” was included in
Title VII in 1964. Instead, the Gilbert—PDA situation showed the legislature
clarifying its purpose, a purpose which, as the 1964 Title VII legislative history
showed, had been unclear. Nonetheless, it secured the proposition that
Brennan and the lower courts touted: Pregnancy discrimination is Title VII sex
discrimination.303
The final step in this journey—and the biggest hurdle for Erickson—was
convincing a court to interpret the PDA also to include drugs and devices used
to prevent pregnancy. Erickson’s argument had to be framed in the context of
women’s role in American society in the year 2001. While many women at
this time continued to choose the role of stay-at-home mom, many others were
working to gain an education and career, to be recognized as successful
businesspersons. These women understood that becoming pregnant early on in

299.
300.
301.
302.
8570.
303.

See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138-40.
This is only one definition of “woman”—the biological one.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 149.
H.R. REP. NO. 95-948 at 3-5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 1978 WL
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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their lives, perhaps during their education, or early in their career, could
prevent or hinder them in reaching their professional goals. Erickson argued,
on behalf of herself and these women, that they should be able to fulfill their
professional goals before choosing to start a family,304 and delaying pregnancy
would be best achieved by utilizing contraceptive drugs and devices.
There is more to the coverage of contraceptive drugs and devices than a
simple medical issue. Because having a child is an event that can change a
woman’s entire life, denial of contraceptive coverage becomes much larger
than a mere health concern, as its consequences affect all aspects of a woman’s
life. In a woman’s professional life, in particular, denial of coverage hampers
the realization of “equality” in the workplace by not insuring medications that
help women maintain their status and progress in the professional sphere. It is
a biological condition that is, by definition, different for men and women; and
that pregnancy is sex-based makes it, as well as its prevention, subject to Title
VII compliance. Furthermore, refusing to cover drugs that prevent a condition
solely confined to women, such as pregnancy, that ultimately limits women in
their life goals does constitute sex discrimination. Indeed, Erickson’s greatest
contribution to the law of sex discrimination is not only its clarification of the
meaning of the PDA, but the “equality effect” that this holding provides for
women in the professional sphere.
B.

Bartell’s Defenses to Title VII Sex Discrimination
1.

Analysis: Defense of Facial Neutrality

Bartell argued that since its prescription plan was “facially neutral,” and
excluded the same medications from men and women, it did not discriminate
based on sex. This, of course, denies the fact that men and women have
different health care needs, and takes us back in time to Gilbert, where the
Court deemed a disability plan nondiscriminatory because “there is no risk
from which men are protected and women are not,” and “no risk from which
women are protected and men are not.”305 The flaw in this reasoning—that
only women get pregnant—was addressed and corrected by the PDA. Bartell
also attempted to show that the plan was neutral in that it excluded all “family
planning” measures.306 Though this defense was intended to defeat the claim
of disparate treatment, the Erickson court took it in a different direction, using

304. Though Erickson intended to delay pregnancy until after she had worked some time, this
is really an issue about planning. Not all women decide to have children after they have a
career—some do it beforehand. The point is that requiring employers to cover prescription
contraceptive drugs and devices in their otherwise comprehensive plans gives women and their
spouses the tools to plan their families.
305. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974)).
306. Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1275 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
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it to imply that men, as well as women, could be discriminated against in the
context of comprehensive employer-based health insurance exclusions.307
Bartell made a point of showing that Viagra was also excluded from its
prescription plan.308 Even though the issue of Viagra coverage was not at bar
in Erickson, the court noted, at least initially, that the argument for Viagra
coverage would be the same as Erickson’s, and could state a claim for
violation of male employees’ rights under Title VII.309 That Bartell’s plan did
not cover Viagra, though unfortunate for the individuals needing it, puts
Erickson and its message about sex discrimination under Title VII in an even
better position. Particularly, that women alleging a sex discrimination case for
denial of contraceptive coverage do not need their employer to provide Viagra
coverage to bolster their arguments for coverage of birth control. Further, it
allows those following the law to not mistake the reasoning behind Erickson.
Under Erickson, female employees are entitled to prescription contraceptive
drug coverage because Title VII and the PDA demand it, not because men
receive coverage for sex-based prescription drugs, namely Viagra. Without
Viagra in the equation, individuals studying the law can use Erickson as a tool
to explain further the scope of the PDA and Title VII. This reduces the
tendency of the reader to see Erickson as a mere battle of the sexes by a simple
comparison of Bartell’s sex-based benefits. Finally, even if Bartell’s
improvised “family planning” exclusion had the facial parity it contended it
had, this would have had little effect on the determination of a Title VII
violation, since adverse disparate impact could have easily stemmed from a
facially neutral policy.310
2.

Analysis: Business Decision to Control Costs

Bartell’s argument that its choice to deny contraceptives was a business
decision aimed to control costs clearly failed because of its facially
discriminatory effect on its female employees. Even a cost-based decision to
exclude prescription contraception that caused sex-based disparate treatment of
Bartell’s employees violates Title VII. If an employer wants to control its
costs, it must be conscious in handling that task, realizing that any “costcontrolling mechanism” must not treat employees differently due to their

307. See id. at 1274-75.
308. Id. at 1275 n.12. For a discussion of Viagra’s position in the dispute over contraceptive
coverage and Title VII, see Kathryn Kindell, Prescription for Fairness: Health Insurance
Reimbursement for Viagra and Contraceptives, 35 TULSA L.J. 399 (2000); Lisa A. Hayden,
Gender Discrimination Within the Reproductive Health Care System: Viagra v. Birth Control, 13
J.L. & HEALTH 171 (1999).
309. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1275 n.12.
310. Id. at 1271-72.
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sex.311 Bartell’s “cost-controlling mechanism” was clearly an impermissible
one, since the method it used to cut costs negatively affected one sex—
women.312 As Erickson noted, Bartell could not control its costs legally by
“penaliz[ing] female employees in an effort to keep its benefit costs low.”313
Moving away from the legal principles in Erickson that prohibit cost-based
business justifications that discriminate against women and viewing them in
another light, this holding against the Bartell Drug Company may actually be
beneficial for it. Though employers who offer comprehensive health benefits
plans will be forced to at least partially cover prescription contraceptive drugs
and devices, this will reduce the number of pregnancies and the health care
costs associated therewith. Furthermore, these new costs are not anticipated to
be significant:
New AGI estimates—based on the actual experience of plans that cover the
cost of oral contraceptives (information obtained from pharmacy benefit
managers administering plans covering over half the U.S. population) and on
national data on use of other methods by privately insured women—show that
the cost of covering the full range of FDA-approved reversible contraceptive
methods is minimal. . . . Providing coverage for the full range of reversible
contraceptive methods would result in a total cost of $21.40 per employee per
year. Assuming standard cost-sharing between employers and employees,
employers would pay $17.12, which translates into a monthly cost of $1.43 per
employee. This would increase employers’ overall insurance costs by only
0.6%.314

In addition, contraceptive coverage will allow female employees an
enhanced ability to plan their families and improve their health in general by
limiting unintended pregnancies while also offering some of the positive side
effects of these drugs (such as birth controls providing more tolerable
menstrual symptoms). Improving the health and family planning abilities of
female employees could conceivably promote a more effective workplace, too.
If workers feel better, they will most likely work better. As the Planned
Parenthood Web site, established to answer questions about contraceptive
coverage, has noted:
A recent study calculated that for an average employer, the total indirect cost
of pregnancy-related absences per year per 1,000 covered female employees
would be $542,000. It is estimated that the average cost to replace female

311. Id. at 1272 (citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669,
676 (1983)).
312. Id. at 1274.
313. Id.
314. Rachel Benson Gold, The Need for and Cost of Mandating Private Insurance Coverage
of Contraception, GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL’Y (Aug. 1998), at http://www.agiusa.org/pubs/journals/gr010405.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2002).
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employees who quit each year due to pregnancy is an additional $14,000 per
employee.315

Similarly, workers who are not suffering the mental and emotional anguish
over an unplanned pregnancy, not to mention the physical limitations, will also
likely perform better in the workplace.
3.

Analysis: Incorrect Interpretation of the Scope of the PDA Not to
Include Contraceptives

In re-examining the court’s response to Bartell’s PDA argument, one can
see that this boils down to differing legal interpretations: Bartell interpreted the
language of the PDA as to only include currently pregnant women; Erickson
believed that it should include women with the ability to become pregnant.
This is where Erickson departed from prior case law and went out on a limb,
extending the PDA to include birth control coverage, ultimately changing the
law. Erickson framed its arguments on what it saw as the intent of Congress in
legislatively overturning Gilbert with the PDA. Though the EEOC had
decided in December of 2000 to take the PDA as far as Erickson had, this was
the first time for a court to apply it in this manner. So this issue of interpreting
Congressional intent for the PDA, as a case of first impression, understandably
did not receive much citation-laden discussion. It was instead a struggle
between tradition and innovation, and this time the latter won.
The Erickson holding is similar to other post-PDA holdings, except that it
formally stated that the protections by the PDA should also apply to
contraceptive drugs in addition to coverage for the condition of pregnancy and
disabilities caused by pregnancy. Erickson was made possible in part due to
the determination by UAW v. Johnson Controls that the PDA applied not only
to policies excluding coverage for pregnant women but also to policy
exclusions which “classif[ied] on the basis of gender and childbearing
capacity.”316 This removed the “pregnant” element from claimants suing under
the PDA amendment to Title VII; now the PDA would be triggered not just by
pregnancy, but also by the policy exclusions that were based on sex and the
woman’s inherent ability to bear children.
4.

Analysis: Contraceptives Not a Health Care Need

Again, Bartell argued that refusal to cover “prescription contraceptive
devices [was] not a violation of Title VII because . . . treating contraceptives
differently from other prescription drugs [was] reasonable in that
contraceptives are voluntary, preventative, do not treat or prevent an illness or
disease, and are not truly a ‘healthcare’ issue.”317 This is a loaded argument
315. Planned Parenthood, supra note 9.
316. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 198-99 (1991).
317. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1272 (emphasis added).
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and rests on at least three concepts that stretch it across not only the question of
medical coverage but social and moral spectra as well. These concepts are: (1)
the legitimacy of pregnancy prevention as a true “healthcare” issue and the
validity of contraceptives as preventative medicine; (2) the voluntary aspect of
contraception; and (3) external control over the sexual behavior (and lives) of
women.
This first concept is the adequacy of “pregnancy-prevention” as a true
healthcare issue. Bartell argued that pregnancy does not qualify as an illness
or disease, and prevention of pregnancy via contraceptives is not a
“healthcare” issue at all.318 Birth control pills, Depro-Provera, Norplant, and
the IUD are indeed medical treatments, drugs and devices manufactured by the
pharmaceutical companies and tested by the FDA. It is important here to note
that this coverage would not extend to over-the-counter contraceptive
therapies, such as condoms, spermicidal ointments or the female sponge, but
only to medications prescribed by doctors. In order to obtain a prescription for
these medications, a patient would have to discuss it with her physician, and
together the two would make a medical decision in the best interests of the
patient. Furthermore, as it has been seen in some cases, these medications are
not only prescribed for pregnancy prevention, but also treat other health
conditions, particularly hormonal disorders. 319
Bartell also argued that the preventative nature of contraceptive drugs and
devices de-classify them as truly legitimate medications.
This label
“preventative” is not inaccurate. Indeed, it is a preventative measure that is not
unlike many other preventative measures that are considered legitimate
healthcare issues such as vaccines, annual gynecological exams and yearly
physicals. In fact, the condition that contraception works to prevent,
pregnancy, carries with it both very serious physically disabling side effects, as
well as an immense long-term life-changing occurrence—a child.
Recently, there has been an effort in the medical field towards encouraging
preventative measures in health care. Consider the popularity of taking aspirin
daily to avoid heart attacks, the necessity of pre-natal care, and the information
about monthly breast self-exams and the importance of mammograms
constantly displayed on all advertising media. Not only are these preventative
medicine practices believed to be advantageous to patients’ health, but they are
also good for the pocketbooks of insurers. For example, in the area of
contraception, one source reported that the care for a mother and child for
pregnancy costs $10,000 and a first trimester abortion costs $450, but a one-

318. Id. at 1272.
319. See supra note 13; EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (D. Minn.
2001). For a more comprehensive discussion of the sex-based prescription needs of women,
including contraception and treatment for hormonal disorders like PMDD, see Karpa, supra note
199.
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year supply of birth control pills costs $300.320 Clearly, it is much less
expensive for an insurer to cover the medications than the abortion or the
pregnancy. And these figures do not take into account the mental, emotional
and physical costs undertaken for the first two options.321 Not unlike other
insured preventative treatments, contraceptives prevent a defined health
condition, “pregnancy,” and the many other health problems associated
therewith.
The most dramatic prevention, of course, is that of a new life that if not
desired by the mother could end up, sadly, aborted. “Half of all pregnancies
are unintended; 28% of women aged 15-44 have had an unplanned birth and
30% have had an abortion; 60% of women in their 30s have had an unplanned
birth or an abortion.”322 On the other hand, the child could be born to a mother
who is not prepared financially, emotionally or psychologically for parenthood,
yielding a devastating situation for both mother and child.
In 1988, 56% of pregnancies were unintended, either mis-timed or unwanted at
conception. The consequences of unintended pregnancy are thought to be
substantial: Unintended pregnancy has been shown to be associated with late
prenatal care, maternal smoking during pregnancy, low birth weight, infant
mortality, child abuse, and developmental delay. . . . “[T]he consequences of
unintended pregnancy are serious, imposing appreciable burdens on children,
women, men and families.”323

Studies have also shown that a woman’s intention to have a child affects the
woman’s prenatal behaviors:324 “That mothers of unintended births are slower
to recognize their pregnancy and to obtain medical attention increases their
health risks and those of their baby.”325 The Center for Disease Control has
found that:

320. Planned Parenthood Los Angeles Hosts Presentation on Growing Movement for
Employers to Cover Contraception, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 23, 2001, at 2.
321. This is assuming it is an unwanted, unanticipated pregnancy. This may be an
appropriate time to note that the author does not suggest by showing a comparison of the cost of a
first-trimester abortion to pregnancy and birth control pill costs, that she advocates the extension
of the PDA to warrant coverage of abortions by employer-based health insurance plans. That,
indeed, is a topic outside the scope of this Note, though it may come into the scope with respect
to medical treatments such as the “morning-after” pill and other, pill-form abortion methods.
However, when comparing these three possible consequences: abortion, carrying an unwanted,
unintended child or preventing the pregnancy altogether, it is clear that the last option is the best
option with respect to physical and emotional trauma and economic costs.
322. Stanley K. Henshaw, Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, FAM. PLAN. PERSP.
Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 24, 29.
323. Theodore J. Joyce et al., The Effect of Pregnancy Intention on Child Development, 37
DEMOGRAPHY 83, 83 (2000) (citations omitted). See Law, supra note 14, at 364-68.
324. Kathryn Kost et al., Predicting Maternal Behaviors During Pregnancy: Does Intention
Status Matter?, FAM. PLAN. PERSP. Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 79, 79.
325. Id. at 86.
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Unintended pregnancy is associated with increased morbidity and mortality for
the mother and infant. Lifestyle factors (for example, smoking, drinking
alcohol, unsafe sex practices, and poor nutrition) and inadequate intake of
foods containing folic acid pose serious health hazards to the mother and fetus
and are more common among women with unintended pregnancies. In
addition . . . approximately half of women with unintended pregnancies do not
start prenatal care during the first trimester.326

Clearly, an employer’s exclusion of “preventative” measures will not
always limit its expenditures for medical insurance. Most important, however,
is not that these contraceptive devices are “preventative” measures, but that
they are also, and to a greater degree, responsible measures taken by sexually
active women to avoid devastating consequences in their lives. Perhaps it is
this self-imposed responsibility, and attempted self-sufficiency of women that
bothers insurers and employers, that has kept this issue undecided for so long.
Second, the defendant questioned the voluntary aspects of the medications.
Men and women in the U.S. take “voluntary” medications every day.327 Take,
for example, allergy medications and acne treatments. These are prescriptions
for conditions that are not necessarily “life threatening,” but the drugs make us
feel better. It is an inconvenience for a patient to suffer from a runny nose
every time she steps out the door in the spring, so she will go to the doctor for
an antihistamine. Similarly, when a patient wants his skin to clear up, he will
see the dermatologist for a topical treatment. In comparison to the
contraceptive medications at issue that will be taken to prevent a pregnancy—
quite possibly the most monumental life experience a woman will encounter—
the argument that they are “voluntary” seriously and misleadingly
underestimates the effects of the condition they prevent. Further, when
comparing the effects of different medications that can be deemed
“voluntary”—antihistamines, acne topical treatments and birth control—it is
plain that the latter has the largest potential to affect a patient’s life.
Another way to examine the “voluntary” argument is that since women are
voluntarily engaging in sex, contraception is not a medical necessity since the
woman could easily alleviate the need for contraception by refraining from
sexual behavior. This brings into light all of the conditions that occur from
sexual intercourse—particularly sexually transmitted diseases.328 Does this

326. CDC on Infant and Maternal Mortality in the United States: 1900-99, 25 POPULATION &
DEV. REV. 821, 824-25 (1999).
327. This argument was made by Justice Brennan in his dissent in Gilbert. See Gen. Elec.
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 151 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also supra notes 153-57
and accompanying text.
328. It also brings into light the question of voluntary acts—either voluntary medical acts like
vasectomies or cosmetic surgery or injuries from voluntary acts such as sports. In Gilbert, these
voluntary acts and procedures were covered, while the pregnancy risk associated with voluntary
sex was not. This issue goes back at least as far as the lower court decisions in Gilbert. See
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“voluntary” argument suggest that when a patient contracts HIV329 from a
sexual partner there should be no obligation to cover the patient since the
behavior she exhibited in contracting the virus was “voluntary?” Is this
argument also to extend to coverage of an HIV inoculation, if one is ever
created? Since sex is a voluntary activity, a participant should be wholly
responsible for the side effects it causes, even if preventative; refusing
prescription contraception coverage inhibits both this responsibility and the
freedoms that accompany it.
The last concept of this argument expresses an overarching “pretext” of the
defendant’s basis for refusing to cover prescription contraceptives. It concerns
the apparent control women assert over their bodies and fertility when using
contraceptive drugs and devices—that contraceptives are “voluntary and
preventative” measures, and that her fertility, since it is controllable, is
different from other health care concerns.330 The court discussed this concept
in terms of the consequences occurring when women were not able to control
their fertility, particularly in terms of unwanted pregnancies and in the
woman’s change of appearance.331 Erickson summarized these consequences:
A woman with an unintended pregnancy is less likely to seek prenatal care,
more likely to engage in unhealthy activities, more likely to have an abortion,
and more likely to deliver a low birthweight, ill, or unwanted baby.
Unintended pregnancies impose significant financial burdens on the parents in
the best of circumstances. If the pregnancy results in a distressed newborn, the
costs increase by tens of thousands of dollars. In addition, the adverse
economic and social consequences of unintended pregnancies fall most harshly
on women and interfere with their choice to participate fully and equally in the
“marketplace and the world of ideas.”332

With or without the Court’s discussion of the sad results and heavy impacts on
the lives of both mother and child in unintended pregnancies, it is not difficult
to understand or to defend women in this all-too-often devastating situation.
However, just as relevant to this discussion is the principle of the matter.
Clouded by a “cost benefit” argument and a strict interpretation of the PDA,
insurers and employers, by excluding contraceptives from prescription plans,
are in effect asserting heavy-handed paternalism. They are asserting control
over the sexual behavior and general health of their female beneficiaries in
Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136, 151; Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661, 665 (4th Cir. 1995);
Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 381-82 (E.D. Va. 1974).
329. For a discussion of the effects of Title VII, the ADA and other federal antidiscrimination statutes on health insurance policies, see Sharona Hoffman, Aids Caps,
Contraceptive Coverage, and the Law: An Analysis of the Federal Anti-Discrimination Statutes’
Applicability to Health Insurance, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315 (2002).
330. Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1272 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
331. Id. at 1273-74.
332. Id. at 1273 (citations omitted).
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excluding coverage and reducing accessibility to these medications. So it
comes down to this question: Who should have the control over women’s
fertility? Until Erickson, it was the employers and insurers. Now, thankfully,
that control will move into the hands of women themselves.
This principle is especially relevant today when women are having sex at
early ages and are planning their marriages and children around professional
careers.
Adolescents in the United States have a higher proportion of pregnancies that
are unintended and that end in abortion than do adults. Moreover, adolescents
who have initiated sexual intercourse have some of the highest age-specific
rates of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) which along with unintended
pregnancy impose enormous costs in human pain and suffering, in social and
economic opportunity, and in social welfare and health care.333

Now, as more women are increasingly sexually active and increasingly present
in the professional spheres, this control over their health and life-path is even
more vital.334 The notion of controlling one’s fertility (i.e., by not engaging in
sex) is reminiscent of a moral code that is admirably traditional and noble in
some societies, and archaic and inequitable in others. While many modern
women are working to assert control while using mechanisms (prescription
contraceptives) to control their fertility, insurers are faced with establishing
their own moral code of coverage.335 Family planning is nothing to be
ashamed of—it is a positive benefit that is the result of growing medical
technology and helps people to maximize their pursuits in life to, in effect,
have better and more fulfilling lives.

333. John S. Santelli et al., Adolescent Sexual Behavior: Estimates and Trends From Four
Nationally Representative Surveys, FAM. PLAN. PERSP., July-Aug. 2000, at 156, 156 (footnotes
omitted).
334. “The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the
Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.” Erickson, 141 F.
Supp. 2d at 1273 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856
(1992)).
335. See generally Hazel Glenn Beh, Sex, Sexual Pleasure, and Reproduction: Health
Insurers Don’t Want You To Do Those Nasty Things, 13 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 119 (1998); Kandice
Engle, Pregnancy Discrimination in the Insurance Industry 1994, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L.
177 (1995-96).
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Analysis: Legislative Issues—New Interpretation of an Old Law

Erickson marked the first time that an employee asked a court to require
her employer to cover her prescription contraceptives.336 The Erickson court
cited to Professor Sylvia Law’s article to set forth reasons why this question
has taken so long to arrive in the courts.337 Law noted that “[f]irst, women
affected by this exclusion, and indeed responsible employers, have difficulty
obtaining even basic information about insurance coverage. Second, there are
few lawyers available who are willing to take the financial risk necessary to
raise these claims.”338 These reasons do not only explain why the question had
not been brought before, but also may show why Erickson was so successful.
Specifically, Erickson was a pharmacist working for a drug company; these are
two parties that are more likely to know a bit more about the health insurance
industry than others. In addition, Erickson was a class action suit brought on
behalf of all female, non-union employees of Bartell by attorney Roberta Riley
and Planned Parenthood; this definitely helped defray the costs to the plaintiff
and very likely provided resources to Riley throughout the litigation.
6.

Analysis: The Question of Contraceptive Coverage Under the PDA Is
a Legislative Issue

Bartell contended that the Erickson court should not answer the question of
whether the PDA involves contraceptive coverage and should leave it to the
legislature. The court refused this request, however, noting its constitutional
obligation to interpret the laws.339 If history would repeat itself, and had the
Erickson court held for Bartell, the issue may have actually been heard by the
legislature, not unlike the events of Gilbert and its legislative overturning in
the PDA. Yet even an incorrect interpretation of the law, would be better than
no interpretation at all. The legislature has, in fact, taken a step in this
direction by introducing the Equity in Prescription Insurance and
Contraceptive Coverage Act (EPICC), which “would secure, as a matter of
federal law, universal coverage for all women with insurance throughout the
United States.”340
VII. CONCLUSION
The Erickson holding, as a case of first impression, should serve as a
beginning—a first step in the expansion of a “truer” phase of sex equity in the
workplace. There is a range of positive possible impacts, beginning with
improved economic and physical well-being for women. Overall, Erickson
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

See Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1275.
Id. at 1275 (citing Law, supra note 14, at 386-91).
Law, supra note 14, at 386.
See Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1276.
Cohen, supra note 9, at 10. See Roth, supra note 65, at 793.
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will prove to benefit employers and employees. As prescription contraceptive
drugs and devices are covered, they will be more accessible to all women, and
hopefully this means that more will utilize them. This will result in fewer
unintended pregnancies, which will benefit women who are not yet prepared
for motherhood. Further, because many prescription plans extend to the
spouses and children of employees, and since the Johnson Controls holding
that female employees and spouses of male employees must enjoy the same
coverage, this holding will affect entire families. The holding will also benefit
families in allowing for more convenient family planning. While not a
complete remedy to the problem of unintended pregnancy, especially for
highly impoverished women, it still will have an effect on the reproductive
behavior of a large group of women. This in turn could have a positive effect
on government programs when women who cannot afford birth control
continue to have children. It will also benefit the employers and insurers
sponsoring coverage. Though the monthly pay-outs (or periodic pay outs,
depending on the drug or device chosen) will rise for insurers, the high costs of
pregnancies will drop as they are prevented.
Looking at the dynamic economy of risk management, we see that costs of
coverage spread out so that all pay for the treatment of some. This means that
after Erickson the cost of prescription contraceptive coverage will be spread
out over all beneficiaries. This author cannot see a more appropriate way of
doing things, especially since it is typically the woman who feels the brunt of
not only pregnancy but of unwanted pregnancy, regardless of what she decides.
Despite the fact that it has taken so long for a federal court to decide this issue,
it was well worth the wait. The Erickson holding will benefit in countless
ways virtually all individuals and entities involved—women and men, children
and families, insurers and employers.
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